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1NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIES 
IN AGRICULTURE
Hrabrin Bachev1
Abstract: This paper suggests a holistic framework for assessment and improvement of 
management strategies for conservation of natural resources in agriculture. First, it  
incorporates an interdisciplinary approach (combining Economics, Organization, Law, 
Sociology, Ecology, Technology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and presents a modern 
framework for assessing environmental management and strategies in agriculture including: 
specification of specific “managerial needs” and spectrum of feasible governance modes 
(institutional environment; private, collective, market, and public modes) of natural resources 
conservation at different level of decision-making (individual, farm, eco-system, local, 
regional, national, transnational, and global); specification of critical socio-economic, natural, 
technological, behavioral etc. factors of managerial choice, and feasible spectrum of (private, 
collective, public, international) managerial strategies; assessment of efficiency of diverse 
management strategies in terms of their potential to protect diverse eco-rights and investments, 
assure socially desirable level of environmental protection and improvement, minimize 
overall (implementing, third-party, transaction etc.) costs, coordinate and stimulate eco-
activities, meet preferences and reconcile conflicts of individuals etc. Second, it presents 
evolution and assesses the efficiency of diverse management forms and strategies for 
conservation of natural resources in Bulgarian agriculture during post-communist 
transformation and EU integration (institutional, market, private, and public), and evaluates
the impacts of EU CAP on environmental sustainability of farms of different juridical type, 
size, specialization and location. Finally, it suggests recommendations for improvement of 
public policies, strategies and modes of intervention, and private and collective strategies and 
actions for effective environmental protection.
1. INTRODUCTION
A significant amount of natural resources (lands, waters, biodiversity, ecosystem 
services etc.) are part of agricultural systems. Modern agriculture significantly affects the 
state and sustainable exploitation of natural resources being a major factor for environmental 
degradation (pollution, destruction, extortion) as well an important contributor for 
conservation and improvement of natural resources. Therefore, the issues associated with the 
effective governance and strategies for sustainable exploitation and conservation of natural 
resources in agriculture are among the most topical in public, political, business and academic 
debates around the globe (Baba et al.; COST; Dobbs and Pretty; Dugos and Dupaz; 
Defrancesco et al; EC; Farmer; Hagedorn; Hart and Latacz; McCanna et al.; Peerlingsa and 
Polman; Reed; Scozzari аnd Mansouri; UN). 
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natural resources conservation in agriculture is at the beginning stage due to the “newness” of 
the problem, and the emerging new challenges and risks in recent years (inter-sectors 
competition for natural resources, global climate change, depletion of non-renewable
environmental resources etc.), and the fundamental development of economic theory in the 
last two and a half decades, and the “lack” of long-term experiences and relevant data for the 
process and efficiency etc. 
Most studies are focused on the specific aspects of natural resource management and 
strategies (soils, waters, biodiversity, agro-ecosystems services) without studying their 
relations, complementarities and contradictions. What is more, they are typically restricted to 
a certain form of governance (eco-product, eco-contract, eco-cooperative, industry eco-
initiative, public eco-program), or specific type of farm (family, agri-firm, cooperative), or
management level (farm, ecosystem, national), or a particular location (region, ecosystem).
Usually they are focused on pure and formal management forms, mechanisms and strategies, 
while various (and often more efficient) informal and complex forms (integral, interlinked, 
multilateral, multilevel) are ignored.
Besides, uni-sectoral analyses are broadly used which separate the governance of 
farming from the management of overall households and rural activities. Moreover, 
“normative” (to some “ideal model’ or “model in another country”) rather than a comparative
institutional approach between feasible alternatives in the specific socio-economic and natural 
environment of a certain farm, region, sector, or country is employed. Likewise, the
significant social costs associated with the governance, known as transaction costs, are not (or 
only partially) taken into consideration. 
Furthermore, unidisciplinary approaches dominate, and efforts of researchers in 
economics, organization, law, sociology, agronomy, ecology, technology, and behavioral and 
political sciences are rarely united to deal with that complex matter. Lastly, there are few
studies on specific institutional, economic, ideological, cultural, natural, etc. factors
responsible for the big variation among countries, regions, industries, and organizations of 
agricultural activity.
Consequently, our understanding on the institutional, behavioral, technological, 
ecological, international, etc. factors of the management and strategies of natural resources 
conservation in agriculture is impeded. Neither the spectrum of feasible formal, informal,
market, private, public, integral, multilateral, transnational, etc. modes of governance can be 
properly identified, nor their efficiency (potential and limits), complementarities, conflicts, 
and prospects of development correctly assessed. All these restrict our capability to assist 
improvement of public policies, strategies, and modes of intervention, and to support 
individual, business and collective strategies and actions for effective natural resources 
conservation.
This paper suggests a holistic framework for assessment and improvement of 
management strategies for conservation of natural resources in agriculture. 
3First, it incorporates an interdisciplinary approach and presents a modern framework for 
assessing environmental management and strategies in agriculture.
Second, it presents evolution and assesses the efficiency of diverse management forms 
and strategies for conservation of natural resources in Bulgarian agriculture during post-
communist transformation and European Union (EU) integration, and evaluates the impacts of 
EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on environmental sustainability of farms of different 
juridical type, size, specialization and location. 
Finally, it suggests recommendations for improvement of public policies, strategies and 
modes of intervention, and private and collective strategies and actions for effective 
environmental protection.
2. Framework for analyzing natural resources management and strategies in 
agriculture
Modes of agro-eco-management and agro-eco-strategies
Environmental management means management of environment preservation and 
improvement activities of individual agents. Maintaining and amelioration of the state of 
natural environment and its individual components (air, waters, lands, biodiversity, climate, 
ecosystem services) requires an effective social order (governance) regulating behavior and 
relations of various agents related to environment - a system of motivation and coordination 
of (eco)actions which is to induce appropriate behavior 2 of individuals and coordinated 
actions at group, regional, national, and transnational levels [Bachev, 2010].
Environmental management in agriculture (or agro-eco-management) comprises the 
environmental management associated with agricultural (food, fibber, fuel, raw material etc.) 
production. It (is to) involves management of activities, relations, and impacts of diverse 
agrarian (farm managers, resource owners, agricultural labor etc.) and non-agrarian
(upstream and down-stream businesses, consumers, residents, interest group etc.) agents 
(Figure 1).  
Individual agrarian agents (farmland owners, farm entrepreneurs, farm labor) may have 
quite diverse strategies in terms of natural resources conservation (Figure 2). According to 
their ideologies and environmental ethics, awareness of environmental risks, managerial and 
technical ability, some individual agents may have direct natural resources conservation goals. 
Accordingly these green individuals will pursue natural resources conservation strategy in 
their everyday life and activity. For instance, for natural resource owners the sustainable 
exploitation (conservation) of their assets is often a primary concern and often it determines 
the type of farms they set up, other ventures (e.g. group or cooperative farms) they participate, 
or lease out contracts they sign. Similarly, a pro-environment farm entrepreneur establishes 
green (individual, cooperative, firm) farming structure following own or collective voluntary 
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companies with eco-social responsibility.
Figure 1: Structures of environmental management in agriculture
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Figure 2: Natural resources management strategies in agriculture
Furthermore, in recent years there have been developed a great number of farms and 
farming enterprises with a primary or a major mission environmental conservation and 
improvement. For instance, in many EU countries environmental cooperatives have been very 
popular there are numerous green agri-firms etc.
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5Nevertheless, most farm structures in modern world have other goals and pursue other 
(than natural resources conservation) strategies – e.g. agri-firms are profit-oriented and their 
primary strategy is to maximize profits for shareholders, cooperatives are member-oriented 
and carry strategy to increase benefits for members etc. However, there have been increasing 
consumer demands for environmental conservation, and for related organic eco- and specific 
products from agriculture. Consequently, many market oriented farms change their behavior 
in order to meet this growing market demand while keeping traditional (profit-making) 
strategy.
Finally, in modern societies there are a great number of formal and informal norms and 
restrictions related to exploitation of natural resources. For instance, in EU there is a huge 
body of environmental legislation and various environmental conservation programs. These 
institutional rules impose individual agents and farming structures mandatory norms and/or 
offer incentive to join voluntary schemes aiming at limiting environmental pressure, securing 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources, preservation of biodiversity, reducing pollution 
and emission of harmful substances etc. This new public order modifies individual strategies 
and behavior and eventually leads toward conservation of natural resources.  
Thus achieving the effective natural resources conservation in agriculture will always be 
result of implementing of multiple voluntary or induced by market, community, public 
policies etc. individuals, farms, businesses, consumers, and public strategies.
In certain cases, eco-management in agriculture is entirely archived through individual 
actions of autonomous agents (farms) within the “Sector Agriculture” (yellow pattern area of 
Figure 1). For instance, a good care and sustainable use of privately owned agricultural lands
and water sources are typical in a family farm since they are integral part of the strategy for 
sustainable development of that family enterprise. Similarly, many group farms have a 
primary goal for sustainable development or are set up as a green farms. Even when the 
individual strategies of farm’s components (e.g. a hired labor, a family or a group member) do 
not coincide with the overall farm strategy, the effective management (internal order) is able 
to achieve the goals for farm’s sustainable growth.
However, the effective environmental management often necessitates concerted 
(collective) actions and eco-strategies of a number of farms as it is in the case of sustainable 
use of a common pasture and limited water supply, protection of local biodiversity, effective 
provision of agro-ecosystem services etc. Furthermore, modern farming activity is often 
profit-oriented and frequently associated with significant positive and/or negative externalities. 
Implementation of individual strategies of different farmers not always leads to overall 
conservation of natural resources. That requires a “common” strategy and managing relations 
(cooperation, reconciling conflicts, recovery of costs) between different farms, and 
increasingly between farmers and non-farmers. 
For example, adverse effects of agricultural activities on water and air quality are often 
felt by residents and businesses in neighborhood or more remote regions. Similarly, 
agricultural contribution to ecosystem services benefits a large number of residents, visitors, 
consumers, businesses, and interest groups requiring certain collective actions for sustainable 
supply. In all these instances, environmental management goes beyond simple (technical, 
6agronomic, ecological) “relations with nature” and embraces the governance of relations and 
collective actions of agents with diverse interests, power positions, awareness, capabilities etc. 
in large geographical, sectoral, and temporal scales [Bachev 2011a]. 
What is more, modern environmental management is associated with growing needs for 
“additional” actions (monitoring, coordination, investments etc.) and integral management of 
natural resources and eco-risks at national and progressively at transnational scale. The later 
include water and garbage management, biodiversity conservation, climate change etc. issues 
demanding effective regional, nationwide, international, and global governance. For instance, 
the effective management of biodiversity “component” of environment includes multilevel 
(individual, sectoral, national, EU, worldwide) and multilateral initiatives of numerous 
farmers, businesses, consumers, residents, interests groups etc. (area under green downward 
arrows, Figure 1). The same is true for waters, lands, air, ecosystem services etc. management.
Thus effective conservation of natural resources will be achieved by coordinated 
collective actions and implementation of multisectoral and multilevel strategies of individual, 
family, partnership, private juridical, public juridical, state etc. agents with diverse immediate 
goals, positions, capability and interests.
Individuals behavior (actions, restriction of actions) are affected and governed by a 
number of distinct modes and mechanisms of management which include (Figure 3):
Figure 3: Modes of environmental management in agriculture 
Figure 2. Modes of environmental management in agriculture 
First, institutional environment (“rules of the game”) - that is the distribution of rights 
between individuals, groups, and generations, and the system(s) of enforcement of these rights 
and rules [Furuboth and Richter; North]. The spectrum of rights could embrace material assets, 
natural resources, intangibles, certain activities, clean environment, food security, intra- and 
inter-generational justice etc. A part of the rights and rules are constituted by formal laws, 
regulations, standards, court decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal rules and 
rights determined by tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms. 
Enforcement of rights and rules is done by the state, community pressure, trust, reputation, 
private modes, and self-enforcement.
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7Institutions and institutional modernization create dissimilar incentives, restrictions and 
costs for maintaining and improving environment, intensifying eco-exchange and cooperation, 
increasing eco-productivity, inducing private and collective eco-initiatives, developing new 
eco- and related rights, decreasing eco-divergence between social groups and regions, 
responding to ecological and other challenges etc.  
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public (state, community) authority, 
international actions (agreements, assistance, pressure), and the private and collective actions 
of individuals. It is associated with the modernization and/or redistribution of the existing 
rights; and the evolution of new rights and the emergence of novel (private, public, hybrid) 
institutions for their enforcement. In modern society a great deal of individuals’ activities and 
relations are regulated and sanctioned by some (general, specific) formal and informal 
institutions. However, there is no perfect system of preset outside rules that can manage 
effectively the entire eco-activity of individuals in all possible (and quite specific) 
circumstances of their life and relations associated with the natural environment.
Second, market modes (“invisible hand of market”) – those are various decentralized 
initiatives governed by free market price movements and the market competition – e.g. 
spotlight exchanges, classical contracts, production and trade of organic products and origins 
etc.
The importance of free market for the coordination (direction, correction) and 
stimulation of economic activities, exchanges and allocation of resources is among 
fundamentals of the Economic theory. Individual agents use (adapt to) markets profiting from 
the specialization and mutually beneficial exchange (trade) while their voluntary 
decentralized actions govern the overall distribution of efforts and resources between 
activities, sectors, regions, eco-systems, countries etc. Nevertheless, there are many instances 
of lack of individual incentives, choices and/or unwanted exchanges related to conservation of 
natural environment - e.g. missing markets, monopoly and power relations, positive or 
negative externalities etc. Consequently, free market “fails” to manage effectively the entire 
eco-activity, exchanges, and investments of individuals.
Third, private modes (“private or collective order”) – those are diverse private 
initiatives and special contractual and organizational arrangements – e.g. voluntary eco-
actions, codes of eco-behavior, eco-contracts, eco-cooperatives etc.
Individual agents take advantage of economic, market, institutional etc. opportunities 
and deal with institutional and market deficiency by selecting or designing mutually 
beneficial private modes (rules) for governing their behavior, relations and exchanges. The 
private mode negotiates own rules or accepts (imposes) existing private or collective order, 
transfers existing rights or gives new rights to counterpart(s), and safeguards absolute  and/or 
contracted rights. In modern society a great part of the agrarian activity is managed by 
voluntary initiatives, private negotiations, “visible hand of the manager”, or collective 
decision-making. Nevertheless, there are many examples of private sector deficiency in 
governing of socially desirable activity such as environmental preservation, eco-system 
services etc.
8Forth, public modes (“public order”) – these are various forms of public (community, 
government, international) intervention in market and private sectors - e.g. public guidance, 
public regulation, public taxation, public assistance, public funding, public provision, property 
right modernization etc.
The role of public (local, national, and transnational) governance has been increasing 
along with the intensification of activity and exchange, and growing interdependence of 
socio-economic and environmental activities. In many cases, effective management of 
individual behavior and/or organization of certain activity through a market mechanism 
and/or a private negotiation would take a long period of time, be very costly, could not reach a 
socially desirable scale, or be impossible at all. Thus a centralized public intervention could 
achieve the willing state faster, cheaper or more efficiently. Nonetheless, there are a great 
number of bad public involvements (inaction, wrong intervention, over-regulation) leading to 
significant problems of sustainable development around the globe [Bachev, 2010].
Fifth, hybrid forms – some combination of the above three modes.
The efficiency of individual management modes is quite different since they have unlike 
potential to: provide adequate eco-information, induce eco-friendly behavior, reconcile eco-
conflicts and coordinate eco-actions of different parties, impact environmental sustainability 
and mitigate eco-risks, and minimize the overall environment management (conservation, 
third-party, transaction) costs, for agents with different preferences and capability, and in the 
specific (socio-economic, natural) conditions of each eco-system, community, industry, 
region, and country. For instance, appropriate eco-information would be enough to induce 
voluntary actions by a “green” farmer, while most commercial enterprises would need outside 
incentives (price premium, cash compensation, punishment); market prices would usually 
coordinate well relations between water suppliers and users, while regulation of relations of 
water polluters and users would require a special private or public order; independent 
strategies and actions of farms would improve the state of local eco-systems, while dealing 
with most of (regional, national, global) eco-challenges requires collective actions in large 
geographical and temporal scales, etc.
“Governance matters” and depending on the (efficiency of) system of management “put 
in place” the individual communities and societies achieve quite dissimilar results in eco-
conservation and improvement. Consequently, the extend of conservation of natural resources 
in agriculture (type of exploitation of natural resources by agriculture and the agricultural 
impact on environment) would differ quite substantially in different stages of development
and among diverse farming structures, eco-systems, regions, and countries.
Needs and factors of natural resources management and strategies in agriculture
According to (awareness, symmetry, strength, harmonization costs of) interests of 
agents associated with natural resources there are different needs for management of actions.
For instance, Figure 4 presents management needs for effective supply of agro-ecosystem 
services. Here Farm 1 has to manage its efforts and relations with the Farm 2 since both 
9receive services from the Ecosystem 1 and affect (positively or negatively) service supply of 
that ecosystem. 
Besides, both farms are to manage their relations with consumers of services from 
Ecosystem 1 (agents in Social system 1) to meet total demand and compensate costs for 
maintaining ecosystem services to that direction. In addition, Farms 1 and 2 have to 
coordinate efforts with agents in Social system 1 to mitigate conflicts with agents in Social 
system 2 (affecting negatively services of Ecosystem 1). 
Furthermore, Farm 1 is to manage its relations with Farm 3 for effective service supply 
from Ecosystem 3, and manage its interaction with Ecosystem 2. Moreover, Farms 1 and 3 
have to manage their relations with Farms 4 and agents from Social system 1 (consumers of 
services of the Ecosystem 3) and Social system 2 (consumers and destructors of Ecosystem 3 
services). 
Figure 4: Management needs for effective supply of agro-ecosystem services
Finally, Farm 1 affecting adversely the Ecosystem 4 services is to manage relations 
with agents in Social system 2 (consumers of Ecosystem 4 services) to reconcile conflicts and 
secure effective flow of ecosystem services. Therefore, the Farm 1 is to be involved in seven
systems of governance in order to assure an effective supply of the services from ecosystems 
of which it belongs or affects. 
Most environmental activity and exchange in agriculture could be managed through a 
great variety of alternative forms. For instance, a supply of environmental preservation 
service could be governed as: voluntary activity of a farmer; though private contracts of the 
farmer with interested or affected agents; though interlinked contract between the farmer and 
a supplier or processor; though cooperation (collective action) with other farmers and 
stakeholders; though (free) market or assisted by a third-party (certifying and controlling 
agent) trade with special (eco, protected origins, fair-trade) products; though a public contract 
specifying farmer’s obligations and compensation; though a public order (regulation, taxation, 
quota for use of resources/emissions); within a hierarchical public agency or by a hybrid form.
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Commonly natural and institutional environment evolve very slowly over a long-term 
periods. Therefore, in the specific natural, socio-economic and institutional environment, the 
choice of management mode would depend on a number of key factors including (Figure 5):
- personal characteristics of individual agents – preferences, believes, ideology, 
knowledge, capability, training, managerial experience, risk-aversion, bounded rationality, 
tendency for opportunism, reputation, trust, power etc. For instance, benefits for farmers from 
eco-management could range from monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect 
revenue; to pleasure of involvement in environment and biodiversity preservation activity.
Figure 5: Factors for managerial and strategy choices for agro-eco-management
- formal and informal institutions - often the choice of management mode is 
(pre)determined by the institutional restrictions as some forms for carrying out farming, 
environmental etc. activities could be socially unacceptable or illegal . For instance, market 
trade of farmland, natural resources, and (some) eco-system services are not allowed.
Furthermore, institutional environment considerably affects the level of management 
costs and thus the choice of one or another form of organization. For instance, in conditions of 
well-working public system of regulations (quality standards, guarantees) and laws and 
contract enforcement, a preference is given to spotlight and classical (standard) contracts. On 
the other hand, when rights on major agrarian and natural resources are not defined or not 
well defined, and absolute and contracted right effectively enforced, then high transaction 
costs could create difficulties (block) effective eco-management - costly unsolvable disputes
between polluting and affected agents, disregards of interests of certain groups or generations 
etc. Consequently, the institutional structures for carrying out agrarian and environmental 
activities become an important factor, which eventually determines the outcome of the system 
(efficiency) and the type of development (sustainability).
- natural and technological factors - eco-management strongly depends on the type of 
environmental challenge (spatial and temporal scale, risks etc.) and natural recourses
endowment as well as on the development of farming, environmental, monitoring, 
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information etc. technologies. For instance, management of water resources depends on the 
advancement of water conservation, use, recycling and monitoring technologies etc.
Efficiency of agro-eco-management and strategies
The problem of “social costs” does not exist in the conditions of zero transaction 
costs 3 and well defined private property rights [Coase]. Then the stahe of maximum 
efficiency is always achieved independent of initial distribution of rights between 
individuals and the mode of governance. All information for the effective potential of 
activity and exchange (optimization of resources, meeting various demands, respecting 
assigned and transferred rights) would be costlessly available to everybody. Individuals 
would costlessly coordinate their activities; define, adapt and implement their strategies, 
define new rights, and protect their (absolute and contracted) rights4, and trade owned 
resources (and rights over them) in mutual benefit with the same (equal) efficiency over 
free market (adapting to price movements), and private modes of different types (contracts, 
firms), and collective decision making (cooperative, association), and in a nationwide 
hierarchy (a single private or state company). Then ecological requirements for 
sustainability and technological opportunities for economies of scale and scope (the 
maximum environmental conservation/enhancement and productivity of resources, 
“internalization of externalities”) and the maximum welfare (consumption, conservation of 
natural resources) would be easily/costlestly achieved5. 
However, when transaction costs are significant, then costless contracting, exchange 
and protection of individual right is impossible. Therefore, initial distribution of property 
rights between individuals and groups, and their good definition and enforcement are 
critical for overall efficiency and sustainability. For instance, if the “right for clean and 
conserved natural environment” is not well-defined, that creates big difficulties foe 
efficient eco-management – costly disputes between polluting and affected agents; not 
respecting interests of certain groups or generations etc.
What is more, in conditions of well-defined rights, eco-management is usually 
associated with significant transaction costs. For example, agents have costs for 
identification and protection of various rights (unwanted take overs from others); studying 
out and complying with diverse institutional restrictions (norms, standards, rules); 
collecting needed technological, environmental etc. Information; finding best partners and 
prices; negotiating conditions of exchange; contract writing and registration; enforcing 
negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring and safeguarding; disputing 
through a court system or another way; adjusting or termination along with evolving 
conditions of production and exchange etc. 
                                                            
3 The costs for governing relations between individuals – for protection and exchange of individual 
rights.
4 When transaction costs are zero then definition (redistribution) of new rights of individuals, 
interests groups, and society as well as effective enforcement of the new rights would be easily 
achived. 
5 Presently there is a principle agreement (“social contract”) for global sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, depending on the specific social preferences that “social consensus” not always is 
expressed in maximum environmental conservation and improvement. At certain stages of 
development the social priority could be given to the economc growth at the “price” of certain 
degradation of natural respources - „over” pollution and emmisisions, unsustainable expoitation, 
partial or complete exsouthion (termination).
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Therefore, in the real world with not completely defined and/or enforced rights, and 
positive transaction costs, the mode of agro-eco-governance is crucial and eventually 
(pre)determine the extent of degradation, conservation and improvement of natural 
resources [Bachev 2010]. That is because different modes have unequal efficiency 
(benefits, costs) for governing the same eco-activity in the specific socio-economic and 
natural environment. Moreover, often the high transaction costs deteriorate and even block 
organisation of otherwise efficient (mutually-beneficial) for all participants eco-activity 
and exchange.
It has to be distinguished the transaction from the proper conservation/“production”
(agronomic, opportunity etc.) environmental costs. In modern conditions the later are 
significant economic costs, which are to be recovered like other technological costs from 
the beneficiaries of conserved/improved natural environment. Often that is the farmer, who 
invest for maintaining productivity of natural resources (soil fertility, water purity, 
ecosystem services), and recover these costs similarly to other investments thought flow of 
future benefits (productivity, profitability, market position, etc.). More frequently, these are 
other agents, who pay for used eco-services directly (buying eco-products and services) or 
indirectly (though collective organisations, taxes and fees etc.).
The effective modes for agro-eco-management optimise the total (transaction and
conservation costs) for agrarian activity – minimizing transaction costs and allowing 
(otherwise mutual beneficial) eco-exchange to be carried out in a socially desirable scale, 
and allowing achievement of minimum/optimum environmental requirement and/or 
exploration of pure technological economies of scale and scope of farm, environmental 
conservation etc. activities.
In very rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governing of natural 
resources, eco-activity and eco-exchange6. Usually, there are a number of alternative 
modes for governing of eco-conservation activity.
Different management modes are alternative but not equally efficient modes for the 
organization of eco-activities. Each form has distinct advantages and disadvantages to 
protect eco-rights and investment, coordinate and stimulate socially desirable eco-
behaviour and activities, explore economies of scale and scope, save production and 
transaction costs. For instance, the free market has a big coordination and incentive 
advantages (“invisible hand”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” 
opportunities to benefit from specialization and exchange. However, market management 
could be associated with a high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to lack of (asymmetry) of 
information, low “appropriability” of some rights (“public good” character), price 
instability, a great possibility for facing an opportunistic behaviour, “missing market” 
situation etc. 
The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination and 
intensification of eco-activity, and safeguard of agent’s eco-rights and eco-investments. 
However, it may require large costs for specification (and writing) contract provisions, 
adjustments with constant changes in conditions, enforcement and disputing of negotiated 
terms etc. 
                                                            
6 For instance, in Japanese agriculture with small-scale paddy fiels organization of water supply 
could not be carried out by individual farms (high mutual assets dependency, non separability of 
water use). Therefore, since ancient time organization of water supply is governed as a public 
projects [Mori]. 
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The internal organization allows a greater flexibility and control on activity (direct 
coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). However, 
extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries (allowing 
achievement of minimum technological or ecological requirements; exploration of 
technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for 
development (initiation, design, formal registration, restructuring), and for current 
management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labour). 
The separation of the ownership from the management (cooperative, corporation, 
public farm/firm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity, environmental
and management efficiency – internal division and specialization of labour; achieving 
ecosystem’s requirements; exploration of economies of scale and scope; introduction of 
innovation; diversification; risk sharing; investing in product promotion, brand names, 
relations with customers, counterparts and authorities. However, it could be connected with 
huge transaction costs for decreasing information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders, decision-making, controlling opportunism, adaptation etc. The cooperative 
and non-for profit form also suffers from a low capability for internal long-term 
investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable character of shares (so called 
“horizon problem”). What is more, evolution and maintenance of large collective 
organisations is usual associated with significant costs – for initiating, informing, 
“collective| decision-making and internal conflict resolution, controlling opportunism of 
(current and potential) members, modernisation, restructuring, liquidation.
Finally, the pubic forms also command high internal (internal administration and 
coordination) and outside (for other private and public agents) costs – for establishment, 
functioning, coordination, controlling, mismanagement, misuse by private and other 
agents, reorganisation, and liquidation. What is more, unlike market and private modes, for 
public organisations there is no automatic mechanism (competition) for selection of 
ineffective forms. Here it is necessary public “decision making” which is associated with 
huge costs and time, and often affected  by strong private interests (power of lobbying 
groups, politicians and their associates, bureaucrats, employees in the public forms) rather 
than efficiency.
Principally the „rational” agents tend to use and/or design such modes for governing 
their diverse activity and relations which are the most efficient  in the specific institutional, 
economic and natural environment – forms maximizing their overall (production, 
ecological, financial, transaction etc.) benefits and minimizing their overall (production, 
environmental, transaction etc.) costs [Bachev 2010]. However, a result of such private 
strategies and optimization of management/activity is not always the most socially
effective distribution of resources and the socially desirable (maximum possible) 
conservation of natural resources. It is well-known that agricultural activity is often 
associated with significant undesirable negative environmental effects – soils degradation, 
waters pollution, biodiversity termination, air pollution, considerable green-house gases 
emissions etc.
Therefore, the system of agro-eco-management is to be improved, and that frequently 
necessitates public (state) involvement in agrarian and environmental management.
Nevertheless, public intervention in (eco)management is not always more effective, since 
public failure is practically possible. Around the globe there are many examples for 
inappropriate, over, under, delay, or too expensive public intervention at all levels. Often 
the public intervention either does not correct market and private sector failures, or 
“correct| them with higher overall costs.
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Thus the criterion for assessing the efficiency of agro-eco-management and 
strategies is to be whether socially desirable and practically possible environmental goals 
are realized with the minimum possible overall costs (direct, indirect, private, public, 
production, environmental, transaction etc.). Accordingly inefficiency is expressed either 
in failure to achieve  feasible (technically, politically, economically) environmental goals
(conservation of natural resources, overcoming certain eco-problems, diminishing existing 
eco-risks, decreasing eco-losses, recovery and improvement of natural environment etc.) or 
achieving of set up goals with more costs comparing to another feasible form of 
management.
Modern socio-economic, institutional and (more often) natural environment in 
changing very fast and often unpredictably7. Consequently, any strategy for effective 
management of natural resources conservation is to be adaptive strategy. Accordingly, 
dominating and other feasible (market, private, public, hybrid) forms are to be assessed in 
terms of their absolute and comparative (adaptation) potential of protect eco-rights and 
investments of agents, assure socially desirable level of environmental conservation 
(enhancement), minimize overall costs, coordinate and stimulate eco-activities, reconcile 
conflicts, and recover long-term costs for organizational development in the specific 
economic, institutional and natural environment.
(The most) effective forms for agro-eco-management
Usually “evolution” of natural and institutional environment is quite slow and in long 
periods of time. Therefore, to a great extent the efficiency of the system of agro-eco-
management will depend on the level of transaction costs.
The transaction costs have behavioral origin: namely individual’s bounded 
rationality and tendency for opportunism [Williamson]. Agrarian agents do not possess full 
information about the system (eco-benefits and costs, effects on others, formal 
requirements, development trends etc.) since collection and processing of such information 
would be either very expensive or impossible (multiple spilovers effects and costs in large 
geographical and temporal scale, future events, partners intention for cheating etc.). In 
order to optimize the decision-making and activity the agents have to spent costs for 
“increasing their imperfect rationality” – for monitoring, data collection, analysis, 
forecasting, training, consulting etc.
Besides, the economic agents are given to (pre-contractual, post-contractual, and 
non-contractual) opportunism. Accordingly, if there is opportunity for some of transacting 
sides to get non-punishably an extra benefit/rent from voluntary or unwanted exchange, he 
will likely take advantage of that. Usually it is very costly or impossible to distinguish 
opportunistic from non-opportunistic behavior because of the bounded rationality of 
agents. What is more, in the real life there is widespread non-contractual opportunism8,
namely unwanted “exchange” or stealing of rights from a private and/or public agents
without any contracting process (because of lack or asymmetry of information, capability 
for detection and protection, weak negotiating positions etc.).
                                                            
7 There have been many financial, economic, food, environmenta crisis in recent years inducing 
fundamental changes in economic structure and institutional rules at local, national, transnational 
and global scales. 
8 Most economic analisis focuse on pre-contractual ("adverse selection") and post-contractual 
("moral hazard") opportunism. Widely distributed non-contractual opportunism is usually ignored.
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Therefore, individual agents have to protect their rights, investments and transactions 
from the hazard of opportunism through: ex ante efforts to find a reliable counterpart and 
to design efficient mode for partners credible commitments; ex post investments for 
overcoming (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible 
opportunism during contract execution stage; and permanent efforts/costs for protection 
from unwanted non-contractual exchange though safeguarding, diversification, 
cooperation, court suits etc.  
Eco-opportunism is also widespread in agriculture. For instance, the farmer knows 
or eventually recognises that his activity is harmful for environment, but in order to save 
additional costs continues to execute risk operations when the negative effects are for other 
agents (owners of natural resources, other farms, non-agrarian agents, society as a whole).
Or farmer sells conventional products as “organic” and profit price premium from unaware
buyers; or he joins the public agro-eco-programs to get subsidies, but does not comply with 
contracted eco-obligations9. 
Part of the transaction costs for eco-management could be determined relatively 
easily e.g. costs for licensing, certifications, tests, purchase of information, hiring 
consultants, payments for guards and lawyers, bribes etc. 
However, assessment of another (significant) part of transaction costs in eco-activity 
is often impossible or very expensive [Bachev, 2011a]. That is why comparative structural 
analysis is to be employed [Williamson]. This analysis would align eco-
activities/transactions (which differ in their attributes) with the governance structures 
(which differ in their costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly transaction cost 
economizing) way. Frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability are 
identified as critical dimensions of eco-activity and transaction10 - the factors responsible 
to the variation of transacting costs between alternative modes of management.
In the specific socio-economic and natural environment, depending to the 
combination of critical factors of eco-activities and eco-transactions, there will be different 
the most-effective forms of their management (Figure 6).
Eco-activity and transactions with good appropriability of rights, high certainty, and 
universal character of investments could be effectively managed by free market through 
spotlight or classical contracts. For instance, there are widespread market modes for 
selling diverse ecosystem services and eco-products - eco-visits, organic, fair-trade, 
origins, self-production or self-pick up of yields from customer11, eco-education, eco-
tourism, eco-restaurants etc.
Frequent transactions with high appropriability could be effectively managed through 
a special contract. For example, eco-contracts and cooperative agreements between 
farmers and interested businesses or communities are widely used including a payment for 
ecosystem services, and leading to production methods (enhanced pasture management, 
reduced use of agrochemicals, wetland preservation etc.) protecting water from pollution, 
mitigating floods and wild fires etc. 
                                                            
9 Not compliance with the terms of public eco-contracts by farmers is widespread even in some of the 
old member states of European Union. 
10 Frequency, uncertainty”, and asset specificity are identified as critical factors of transaction costs by 
Williamson [Williamson] while appropriability added by Bachev and Labonne [Bachev and Labonne].
11 These type of services are very popular for residents of big Japanese cities. 
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Figure 6: Principle modes for environmental management in agriculture
Generic modes
                      Critical dimensions of transactions
                                              Appropriability
                                           High     Low
                                           Assets Specificity
           Low             High
                                             Uncertainty
       Low      High      Low        High
                                             Frequency
High Low High Low High Low High Low
Free market  
Special contract form  
Internal organization  
Third-party 
involvement
 
Public intervention 
 - the most effective mode;  - necessity for a third party involvement
When uncertainty is high and assets dependency (specificity) is symmetrical the 
relational (“neoclassical”) contract could be used. Since detailed terms of transacting and 
results are not known at outset (a high uncertainty), a framework (mutual expectations) 
rather than a specification of obligations of partners is practiced (opportunisms is
(self)restricted due to the symmetrical dependency of investments of partners). A special 
contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with a low uncertainty, high specificity 
and appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully safeguarded through 
contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant obligations of partners in 
all possible contingencies (no uncertainty exist).
Transactions and activity with high frequency, big uncertainty, and great assets 
specificity have to be managed within internal organization. For instance, a good portion 
of eco-investments are strongly specific to (certain land plots, eco-systems etc.) a farm and 
can be effectively implemented and “paid-back” within the borders of the particular farm.
The high interdependency (specificity) of eco-investments with other farm’s assets 
and activity is the reason a great part of agro-eco-management to be executed by different 
type of farms – family, cooperative, agri-firms, public, hybrid.  Despite that there are cases 
when farms and other agents are specialised in eco-management and are entirely engaged 
in (aimed at) “keeping natural resources in a good condition” or “recovery or amelioration 
of natural environment”. Here agricultural activity either does not exist (e.g. prolonged 
follow up) or it is practiced as far as it is required by purely agronomic, ecological and 
other (e.g. educational, rehabilitation etc.) needs. According to the extent of appropriability 
of results and the universal character of investments, these farms could be market-oriented 
(selling eco-services to landlords or other buyers), community12 (funded by communities, 
interests groups) or public (e.g. for conservation of important eco-systems like national 
parks, natural phenomenon etc.).
                                                            
12 In responre to the unprecedented decrease in number of farms in Japan a “third sector” has 
developed  - in many places community farms are estanblished aiming at conservation of natural 
environment rather than farming.
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Very often the effective scale of specific investment in agro-ecosystem services 
exceeds the borders of traditional agrarian organisations (family farm, small partnership).
For instance, much of eco-investments, which are done in one farm (protection of waters 
and air, biodiversity etc.) benefit other farms or non-agrarian agents. Often, dependency of 
eco-investments of a farm is unilateral from the agent benefiting from the positive result.
Besides, the positive impact of eco0investment often depends on the minimum scale of 
activity and frequently requires collective action (co0investment). Consequently, eco-
activity/assets of many farms happen to be in a high mutual-dependency with the eco-
activity/assets of other farms and other non-agrarian agents in a large spacial and often 
temporal scale.
This if specific capital (knowledge, technology, equipment, funding) cannot be 
effectively organized within a single organization13, then effective external form(s) is to be 
used – e.g. joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, joint investment in labels and origins, 
lobbying for public intervention etc. For instance, environmental cooperatives are very 
successful in some European countries where there are strong incentives for cooperation 
due to the mutual-dependency of farms eco-activity, evolving “market” for eco0services, 
and widespread application of long-term public eco-contracts for eco-coalition. There is 
rapid development of diverse association of producers around specific capital invested in 
eco-products and services, trademarks, advertisement, marketing channels etc.
Nevertheless, costs for initiation and maintaining collective organization for 
overcoming unilateral dependency are usually great (big number of coalition, different 
interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is unsustainable or does not 
evolve at all. That strongly necessitates a third-party involvement (non-governmental or 
state organisation) to make such organisation possible or more efficient.
The transaction costs analysis let us identify situations of market and private sector 
failures. For instance, serious problems usually arise when condition of assets specificity is 
combined with high uncertainty and low frequency, and when appropriability is low. In all 
these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement in transactions 
is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation, funding) in order to make them 
more efficient or possible at all. Emergence and unprecedented development of special 
origins, organic farming and system of fair-trade, are good examples in that respect. There 
is increasing consumer’s demand (price premium) for these products but their supply could 
not be met unless effective trilateral management (including independent certification and 
control) is put in place.
Respecting others rights or granting out additional rights could be managed by “good 
will” or charity actions. For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental 
initiatives (“codes of behaviour”) have emerged driven by farmers’ preferences for eco-
production, competition in industries, and responds to public pressure for a sound 
environmental management. However, voluntary and charity initiatives could hardly 
satisfy the entire social demand especially if they require considerable costs. Besides, 
environmental standards are usually “process-based”, and “environmental audit” is not 
conducted by independent party, which does not guarantee a “performance outcome” 14.
Most environmental management requires large organizations with diversified 
interests of agents (providers, consumers, destructors, interest groups etc.). Emergence of 
                                                            
13 coalition made, minimum scale of operations reached, economy of scale and scope explored.
14 The huge food safety and environmental pollution scandals in recent years proves that private 
shceems often fail (high information asymmetry and possibility for opportunism). 
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special large-members organizations for dealing with low appropriability is slow and 
expensive, and they are not sustainable in long run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, 
there is a strong need for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international 
assistance) intervention to make such eco-activity possible or more effective [Bachev 
2010].
For example, supply of “environmental goods” by farmers could hardly be governed 
through private contracts with individual consumers because of the low appropriability, 
high uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, 
charging all potential consumers, disputing). At the same time, the supply of additional 
environmental protection service is very costly (in terms of production and organization 
costs) and would unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, the financial 
compensation of farmers by willing consumers through a pure market mode (eco-fee, eco-
premium to price) is also ineffective due to the high information asymmetry, and massive 
costs for enforcement, disputing and excluding of “dishonest” users. A third-party mode 
with a direct public involvement would make that transaction effective: on behalf of the 
consumers the State agency negotiates with individual farmers a public contract for 
“environment conservation service”, coordinates activities of various agents, provides 
public payments for compensation of farmers, and controls implementation of negotiated 
terms15.
Public modes and strategies for management of natural resources in agriculture
In modern agriculture there are a great variety in forms and efficiency of public 
intervention on agri-eco-management 16 . In assessment of public modes for agro-eco-
management it has to be taken into account the overall (public and private) costs for 
implementation and transaction for achievement of social eco-goals in comparison with 
another practically possible form of intervention. The Discrete structural analysis is to be 
applied which would assist the assessment of efficiency and the design of forms and 
strategies of public intervention. Depending on uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for
specific investment of public involvement different form of public intervention will be the 
most efficient (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Principle modes for public intervention in environmental management
            Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity
Low                               -----------------------------------                                     High
New property 
rights and 
enforcements
Public 
regulations
Public 
taxation
Public 
assistance
Public
funding
Public
provision
Interventions with a low uncertainty and assets specificity would normally require a 
smaller public organization - more regulatory modes, improvement of the general laws and 
contract enforcement etc. When uncertainty and assets specificity of transactions increases 
a special contract mode would be necessary – e.g. employment of public contracts for 
                                                            
15 Public eco-contracts are the most widely used instrument for impriving agro-eco-activity in 
European Union. What is more, further “greening” of the Common Agricultural Policies and 
augmentation of “eco-subsidies” is planed from 2014 on.
16 For instance, review of diverse modes of governance of agro-ecosystem services is made by Bachev 
[2011a].
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provision of private services, public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary 
labour contract for carrying out special public programs, leasing out public assets for 
private management etc. And when transactions are characterized with high assets 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, then an internal mode and a bigger public 
organization would be necessary – e.g. permanent public employment contracts, in-house 
integration of crucial assets in a specialized state agency or public company etc. 
Initially, it is necessary to be specifies the ways to correct existing and emerging eco-
problems in market and private sector (difficulties, costs, risks, failures). The appropriate 
public involvement would be to create an environment for: decreasing uncertainty 
surrounding market and private transactions, increasing intensity of exchange and 
cooperation, protecting private rights and investments, and making private investments less 
dependent. For instance, State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards 
for farm inputs and produces, certifies producers and users of natural resources, transfers 
water management rights to farms associations, sets up minimum farm-gate prices etc. 
(Table 1) All these facilitate and intensify private eco-initiatives and (market and private) 
eco-transactions and increase efficiency of economic organizations.  
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of rights and results 
of activity and investment have to be considered. The low appropriability is often caused 
by unspecified or badly specified private rights [Bachev, 2004]. In that case, the most 
effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce new private property 
rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and environmental resources; rights on issuing 
and trading eco-bonds and shares; tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on 
intellectual agrarian property and origins etc. That would be efficient when privatization of 
resources or the introduction and enforcement of new rights is not associated with 
significant costs (uncertainty, recurrence, and level of specific investment are low). 
Such public intervention effectively transfers the organization of transactions into the 
market and private management, liberalizes market competition and induces private 
incentives (and investments) in certain eco-activities. For instance, tradable permits 
(quotas) are used to control the overall use of certain resources or level of a particular type 
of pollution. They give flexibility allowing farmers to trade permits and meet their own 
requirements according to their adjustment costs, specific conditions of production etc. 
That form is efficient when a particular target must be met, and the progressive reduction is 
dictated through permits while trading allows the compliance to be achieved at least costs 
(through a private management). What is more, the tradable rights could be used a market 
for environmental quality to develop. The later let private agents to realise new eco-
strategy purchasing permits from the market and taking them out of market turnover and 
utilisation. In that way the environmental quality could be practically raised above the 
initially “planned” (by the Government) level, and would not have been achieved without 
these additional private eco-initiatives.
In other instances, it would be more efficient to put in place regulations for trade and 
utilization of resources, products and services – e.g. standards for labour safety, product 
quality, environmental performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, 
introduction of foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) 
contamination; a ban on application of certain chemicals or technologies; regulations for 
trading ecosystem service protection; foreign trade regimes; mandatory eco-training and 
licensing of farm operators etc. 
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Table 1. Effective modes for public intervention in environmental management in agriculture
New property 
rights and 
enforcement
Public regulations Public 
taxation
Public assistance 
and support
Public 
provision
Rights for 
clean, 
beautiful 
environment, 
biodiversity;
Private rights 
on natural, 
biological, and 
environmental 
resources; 
Private rights 
for (non) profit 
management 
of natural 
Tradable 
quotas 
(permits) for 
polluting; 
Private rights 
on intellectual 
property, 
origins, 
(protecting) 
ecosystem 
services;
Rights to issue 
eco-bonds, 
shares;
Private 
liability for 
polluting
Regulations for organic 
farming;
Regulations for trading of 
protection of ecosystem 
services;
Quotas for emissions and use 
of products, resources;
Regulations for introduction of 
foreign species, GM crops;
Bans for certain activity, use 
of inputs, technologies;
Norms for nutrition and pest 
management;
Regulations for water 
protection against nitrates 
pollution;
Regulations for biodiversity, 
landscape management; 
Licensing for water or agro-
system use;
Quality, food safely standards;
Standards for good farming 
practices;
Mandatory eco-training;
Certifications, licensing;
Compulsory eco-labeling;
Designating environmental 
vulnerable, reserve zones;
Set-aside measures;
Inspections, fines, ceasing 
activities
Tax 
rebates, 
exception, 
breaks;
Eco-
taxation 
on 
emissions
, 
products;
Levies on 
manure 
surplus;
Levies on 
farming 
or export 
for 
innovatio
n funding;  
Waste tax
Recommendation, 
information, 
demonstration;
Direct payments, 
grants for eco-
actions of farms, 
businesses, 
communities;
Preferential 
credit;
Public eco-
contracts;
Government 
purchases (water, 
other limited 
resources);
Price, farm 
support for 
organic 
production, 
special origins;
Funding eco-
training;
Assistance in 
farm, eco-
associations;
Collecting fees 
for paying 
ecosystem service 
contributors
Research,  
extension; 
Market 
information;
Agro-
meteorologic
al forecasts;
Sanitary and 
veterinary 
control, 
vaccination, 
prevention 
measures;
Public 
agency 
(company) 
for important 
ecosystems;
Pertaining 
“precaution 
principle”; 
Eco-
monitoring;
Eco-
foresight;
Risk 
assessment
The large body of environmental regulations in European Union and other developed 
countries aim changing farmers behaviour, and directing toward new strategies restricting 
the negative impact on environment. It makes producers responsible for the 
“environmental effects” (externalities) of their products or the management of products 
uses (e.g. waste). This mode is effective when a general improvement of the performance 
is desired but it is not possible to dictate what changes (in activities, technologies) is 
appropriate for a wide range of operators and environmental conditions (high uncertainty 
and information asymmetry). When the level of hazard is very high, the outcome is certain 
and the control is easy, and no flexibility exists (for timing or the nature of socially 
required result), then the bans or strict limits are the best solution. However, the 
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regulations impose uniform standards for all regardless of the costs for compliance 
(adjustment) and give no incentives to over-perform beyond a certain (regulated) level. 
In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of tax system would be the 
most effective form for public intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, 
breaks, credits) are widely used to create favourable conditions for certain (sub)sectors and 
regions, forms of agrarian organization, or specific types of activities. The environmental 
taxation on emissions or products (inputs or outputs of production) is also applied to 
reduce the use of harmful substances. Eco-taxes impose the same conditions for all farmers 
using a particular input and give signals to take into account the “environmental costs” 
inflicted on the society as a whole (or big communities of affected individuals). Taxing is 
effective when there is a close link between the activity and the environmental impact, and 
when there is no immediate need to control the pollution or to meet the targets for 
reduction. However, an “appropriate” level of the charge is required to stimulate a 
desirable change in farmers’ behaviour. Furthermore, some emissions (e.g. nitrogen) vary 
according to the conditions of application (fertilisation with N) and attempting to reflect 
this in tax system often result in complexity and high administrating costs. 
In some cases, a public assistance and support to private organizations is the best 
mode for intervention. The public financial support for environmental actions is the most 
commonly used instrument for improving environment performance of farmers. It is easy 
to find an economic justification for the public payments as a compensation for the 
provision of an “environmental service” by farmers. However, the share of farms 
participating in various agri-environmental support schemes has not been significant. That 
is a result of voluntary (self-selection) character of this mode which does not attract 
farmers with the highest environment enhancement costs (most intensive and damaging 
environment producers). In some countries the low-rate of farmers’ compliance with the 
environmental contracts is a serious problem17. The later cannot be solved by augmented 
administrative control (enormous enforcement costs) or introducing bigger penalty 
(politically and juridical intolerable measure). Principally, it is estimated that the agri-
environmental payments are efficient in maintaining the current level of environmental 
capital but less successful in enhancing the environmental quality. 
Another disadvantage of “payment system” is that once introduced it is practically 
difficult (“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals are achieved or there are 
funding difficulties. Moreover, withdraw of subsidies may lead to further environmental 
harm since it would induce the adverse actions (intensification, return to conventional 
farming strategies). Other critics of subsidies are associated with their “distortion effect”, 
negative impact on “entry-exit decisions” from polluting industry, unfair advantages to 
certain sectors in the country or industries in other countries, not considering the total costs 
(such as transportation and environmental costs, “displacement effect” in other countries). 
Often providing public information, recommendations, training and education to 
farmers, rural agents, and consumers are the most efficient form since they improve their 
capability and strategies. In some cases, a pure public organization (in-house production, 
public provision) will be the most effective one as it is in the case of important agro-
ecosystems and national parks; agrarian research, education and extension; agro-
meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary control etc.
Usually, effective implementation of a long-term natural resources conservation
strategy requites combined public intervention (a governance mix). The necessity of 
                                                            
17 40% of French farmers experience problems implementing public eco-contracts [Dupraz еt al.].
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multiple public intervention is caused by the fact that: different natural resources and 
diverse challenges associated with them need different instruments and form of public 
intervention; individual modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes;
frequently the combined effect is higher that sum of individual effects; the
complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; restricted potential of some less 
expensive forms to achieve a certain (but not the entire) level of socially preferred 
outcome; possibility to get an extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for 
participation in public programs); particularity of problems to be tackled; specific critical 
dimensions of managed activity; uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with 
likely impact of new forms; needs for “precaution”; practical capability of State to 
organize (administrative potential to control, implement) and fund (direct budget resources 
and/or international assistance) different modes; and dominating (right, left) policy 
doctrine. 
Besides, the level of an effective public intervention (management) depends on the 
scale of ecosystem and type of problem. There are public involvements which are to be 
executed at local (farm, agro-ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require 
nationwide management. There are also activities, which are to be initiated and 
coordinated at international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to the strong 
necessity for trans-border actions (needs for a cooperation in natural resources and 
environment management, for exploration of economies of scale/scale, for prevention of 
ecosystem disturbances, for governing of spill-overs) or consistent (national, local) 
government failures. Often the effective governance of many challenges and risks of agro-
ecosystems requite multilevel management with combined actions of different levels, and 
involving various agents, and different geographical and temporal scale.
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision etc.) modes must have built special 
mechanisms for increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality and powerlessness) 
of bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting 
possible opportunism (opportunity for cheating, interlinking, abuse of power, corruption) 
of public officers and other stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new 
monitoring, assessment and communication technologies, increasing transparency (e.g. 
independent assessment and audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests 
groups in management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, applying “market like”
mechanisms (competition, auctions) in public projects design, selection and 
implementation would significantly increase the incentives and decrease the overall costs. 
Principally, a pure public organization should be used as a last resort when all other
modes do not work effectively [Williamson]. “In-house” public organization has higher 
(direct and indirect) costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and 
liquidation. What is more, unlike market and private forms there is not automatic 
mechanism (competition) for sorting out the less effective modes 18 . Here a public 
“decision making” is required which is associated with high costs and time, and it is often 
influenced by strong private interests (power of lobbying groups, policy makers and their 
associates, employed bureaucrats) rather than the efficiency. What is more, widespread 
“inefficiency by design” of public modes is practiced to secure (rent-taking) positions of 
certain interest groups, stakeholders, bureaucrats etc. Along with development of general 
institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”, transparency) and monitoring, 
measurement, communication etc. technologies, the efficiency of pro-market modes 
                                                            
18 It is not rare to see highly inefficient but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the world.
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(regulation, information, recommendation) and contract forms would get bigger 
advantages over the internal less flexible public arrangements. 
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure 
public forms given coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In majority of cases, 
involvement of farmers, farmers organizations and other beneficiaries increases efficiency 
- decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives for 
private costs-sharing, and reduces management costs [Bachev, 2004]. For instance, a 
hybrid mode would be appropriate for carrying out the supply of preservation of 
environment, biodiversity, landscape, historical and cultural heritages etc. That is 
determined by the farmers information superiority, strong interlinks of activity with 
traditional food production (economy of scope), high assets specificity to the farm (farmers 
competence, high cite-specificity of investments to the farm and land), and spatial 
interdependency (needs for cooperation of farmers at a regional or wider scale), and not 
less important – farm’s origin of negative externalities. 
Furthermore, enforcement of most labour, animal welfare, biodiversity etc. standards 
is often very difficult or impossible at all. In all these cases, stimulating and supporting 
(assisting, training, funding) private voluntary actions are much more effective then 
mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing 
costs.  
If there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
(government, local authority, international assistance) intervention is not introduced in a 
due time, then the agrarian “development” is substantially deformed. Consequently, all 
class of socially needed eco-activities and investment are blocked, natural resources are 
degradated or pollutes in large scales, sustainability of farms structures in reduces etc.
Stages in analysis of environmental management and strategies in agriculture
Analysis and improvement of public agro-eco-management and strategies is to include 
following stages (Figure 8):
First, assessment of specific management needs of conservation of natural resources 
utilized and/affected by agriculture. The later depends on particular characteristics of diverse 
natural resources and ecosystems they are part of, and the number, interests and strategies of 
related agents (example in Figure 4).
For instance, persistence of serious eco-problems and risks is an indicator that an 
effective system of eco-management is not put in place. Therefore, trends, factors, problems, 
and risks associated with natural environment and its individual elements (land, water, air, 
biodiversity, eco-systems, climate etc.) are to be identified. Modern science offers quite 
precise methods to assess the state of environment, and detect existing, emerging and likely 
challenges - environmental changes, degradations, destructions and depletion of natural 
resources, eco-risks etc. [MEA]. 
o What is more, science offers reliable instruments to estimate agricultural contribution 
to and impact on the state (“health”) of environment and its different components, including 
in different spatial and temporal scales. For instance, there are widespread applications of 
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numerous eco-indicators for pressure, state, respond, and impact as well as for integral 
assessment of agrarian environmental sustainability [FAO, 2010a]. 
Figure 8: Stages in analysis and improvement of public agro-eco-management  
The lack of serious eco-problems, conflicts and risks is an indicator that there is an 
effective system for eco-management, and therefore there is no need for changing public 
strategy for natural resources conservation. However, usually there are significant or growing 
environmental problems and risks associated with agriculture in developed and developing 
countries alike.
Second, assessment is to be made on efficiency and potential of available and other 
feasible modes and mechanisms of management for natural resources conservation, and for 
overcoming existing, emerging and likely eco-problems and risks associated with agriculture. 
The analysis is to embrace the system of agro-eco-management and its individual 
components – institutional environment and various (formal, informal, market, private, 
contract, internal, individual, collective, public, specialized, multifunctional, simple, complex, 
etc.) forms for governing eco-activities of agrarian agents (farms of different type). In fact 
most analyses are restricted to a certain form (formal, farm, cooperative, public program) 
ignoring other important, dependent, or complementary modes. 
Efficiency of individual modes are to be evaluated in terms of their strategies and 
(comparative) potential to safeguard and develop agents eco-rights and investments, stimulate 
socially desirable level of environment protection behavior and activity, rapid detection of 
eco-problems and risks, cooperation and reconciliation of eco-conflicts, and to save and 
recover total environmental (conservation, recovery, enhancement, transaction, direct, indirect, 
private, public etc.) costs. Furthermore, efficiency of individual forms cannot be fully 
understood without analyzing the complementarities and/or contradictions between different 
forms and strategies – e.g. the high complementarities between (some) private, market and 
public forms for eco-management; conflicts between the “gray” and “light” sector of 
agriculture etc.
Most assessments include only direct, production (eco-recovery, eco-maintenance, eco-
enhancement), or program (international assistance, taxpayer) costs. Analysis is to include all 
Identification of 
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management needs, 
problems, and risks
Assessing efficiency of 
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public intervention
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modes forpublic 
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(social) costs associated with different forms of eco-management – private, third-party, public, 
current, long-term, production, transaction etc. In addition to proper individual and third-party 
production (technological, agronomic, ecological etc.) costs, the eco-management is usually 
associated with significant transaction (governance) costs. 
Efficiency checks are to be performed periodically even when the system of agro-eco-
management “works well”. That is because the good conservation of natural resources could 
be done at excessive social costs or further improvement of environment may be done at the 
same social costs. In both cases there is alternative more efficient organization of agro-eco-
management - e.g. too expensive for taxpayer state eco-management (in terms of incentives, 
total costs, adaptation and investment potential) could be replaces with more effective private, 
market or hybrid mode (public-private partnership).
Usually assessments are limited to absolute efficiency of individual forms of eco-
management (related costs, environmental effects) ignoring their comparative efficiencies. 
The analysis is to incorporate both absolute and comparative (in relation to other feasible 
modes) efficiency of diverse management modes. 
Comprehensive analysis let determine deficiencies (“failures”) in dominating market, 
private, and public modes to manage effectively existing, emerging and likely eco-problems 
and risks, and specify the needs for (new) public intervention in agrarian eco-management.
They could be associated with; impossibility for achieving socially desirable and practically 
possible environmental goals, significant transaction difficulties (costs) of participating agents, 
inefficient utilization of public money and resources etc.
Third, alternative and practically possible modes for new public intervention able to 
correct (market, private and public) failures are to be identified, their comparative efficiency
and complementarities assessed, and the most efficient one(s) selected. Only technically, 
economically, and politically feasible modes of new public intervention in environmental 
management are to be specified. Their comparative (goal achieving, coordinating, stimulating, 
costs-minimizing) efficiency to and complementarities with other practically possible modes 
of public involvement (assistance, public-private partnership, property rights modernization 
etc.) is to be assessed, and the best one(s) introduced. 
Public modes not only support (market and private) transaction, but are also associated 
with significant (public and private) costs. Therefore, assessment is to comprise all costs for 
implementation and transaction - direct (tax payer, assistance agency) expenses, and 
transacting costs of bureaucracy (for coordination, stimulation, control of opportunisms and 
mismanagement), and costs for individuals’ participation and usage of public modes 
(adaptation, information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes), and costs for community 
control over and for reorganization of bureaucracy (modernization, liquidation), and 
(opportunity) costs of public inaction19.
                                                            
19 Some of the environmental losses are expressed in economic terms (e.g. decline in income in related 
industries, replacement and recovery costs, negative effects on human welfare). However, a significant 
part of the social value cannot be expressed in monetary terms – e.g. negative impact in biodiversity, 
other ecosystems, human health, future generations etc.
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Suggested analysis is to be made at different levels (farm, eco-system, regional, sectors, 
national, international) according to the type of eco-challenge and the scale of collective 
actions necessary to mitigate specific eco-problems and risks for each component of the 
natural environment (soils waters, air, etc.) and integrally for the natural environment as a 
whole. It is not one time exercise completing in the last stage with a perfect system of eco-
management. It is rather a permanent process which is to improve eco-management along 
with the evolution of natural environment, individual and communities (social) awareness and 
preferences, and modernization of technologies and institutional environment. Besides, public 
(local, national, international) failure is also possible (and often prevail) which brings us into 
the next cycle in improvement of eco-management in agriculture.
The comparative institutional analysis let define the efficiency and the potential of 
divers mechanisms and modes of management to deal with diverse problems and risks 
associated with the natural environment. Moreover, it let improve the design of the new forms 
of public intervention according to the specific market, institutional and natural environment 
of a particular farms, eco-system, region, sub-sector, country, and in terms of perfection of 
coordination, adaptation, information, stimulation, restriction of opportunism, controlling (in 
short – minimizing transaction costs) of participating actors (decision-makers, implementers, 
beneficiaries, other stakeholders). 
What is more, that analysis unable us to predict likely cases of new public (local, 
national, international) failures due to impossibility to mobilize sufficient political support 
and necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies in the 
specific socio-economic environment of a particular country, region, sub-sector etc. Since 
public failure is a feasible option its timely detection permits foreseeing the persistence or 
rising of certain environmental problems, and informing (local, international) community 
about associated risks.
3. Evolution of natural resource conservation management and strategies in 
Bulgarian agriculture
Institutional environment 
During most of transition, rights on agrarian resources (farmland, water) and diverse 
eco-rights (on clean, aesthetic nature; preservation of nature resources, biodiversity) were not 
defined or were badly defined and enforced (Table 2). Inefficient public enforcement of laws, 
and absolute and contracted rights was common. That has negative consequences on the 
development of farming structures and efficiency of eco-management [Bachev, 2010a].
Privatization of farmland and assets of ancient public farms took almost 10 years to 
complete. During a good part of that period, the management of critical agrarian resources 
was in ineffective and “temporary” structures (organizations under privatization, liquidation 
or reorganization; Land commissions etc.) with no interests in effective and sustainable 
exploitation. Besides, short-term lease of natural resources and material assets was a major 
form for the farm extension [Bachev, 2010a].
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Table 2. Evolution of environmental management in Bulgarian agriculture
Institutions Private modes Market modes Public modes
Post-communist transition (1989-2000)
Not well 
defined eco-
and resource 
rights, bad 
enforcement; 
Sustainability 
concept absent
Provisional lease in 
contracts on natural 
resources;
Unregistered farms; 
Firms; 
Cooperatives
Trade with 
informal brands, 
origins, and 
ecosystem services;
Free (monopoly) 
agricultural water 
pricing
State and cooperative farms;
Organization under privatization, 
liquidation and reorganization;
Outdated system of eco-regulations, 
monitoring and information
Pre-accession to EU (2001-2006)
Better defined 
and badly 
enforced rights 
on agrarian 
and eco-
resources, and 
contracts
Unregistered farms; 
Firms;
Cooperatives;
Water User 
Associations;
Vertically 
integrated modes
Trade with formal 
brands, origins, 
organic products, 
and ecosystem 
services;
Free (monopoly) 
agricultural water 
pricing
Special Accession Program for 
Agrarian and Rural Development; 
Cross-compliance; Environmental 
regulations, standards, and agencies; 
Regulations for organic farming; 
Agricultural Advisory Service
EU membership (since January 1, 2007)
Well-defined 
rights, and 
better 
enforcement;
EU 
Community 
Acquis;
Collective 
institutions
Unregistered farms; 
Firms; 
Cooperatives;  
Water  User 
Associations;
Vertically
integrated modes;
NGOs; Codes of 
behavior; Eco-
labels
Trade with formal 
brands, origins, 
organic products, 
and ecosystem 
services;
Free (monopoly) 
agricultural water 
pricing;
Insurance against 
natural disasters
EU eco-regulations and standards; 
EU Operational Programs; National 
programs for eco-management; 
National Plan for Agrarian and Rural 
Development;  Direct payments; 
Advisory Service; Eco-monitoring 
and assessment; Protected zones 
(NATURA); Compensations for 
natural disasters; Mandatory eco-
training; Garbage taxation;State 
companies for Natural Parks/ Support 
to trans-border initiatives
Out-dated and sectoral system of public policing, regulations and control dominated 
until recently, which corresponded little to the contemporary needs of eco-management. There 
was no modern system for monitoring the state of soil, water, and air quality, and credible 
information on the extent of environmental degradation. There was no awareness of the 
“concept” of sustainable development and any needs to include it in the public policy, and 
private and community agenda. The lack of “culture of sustainability” has also impeded the 
evolution of voluntary measures, and private and collective actions (and institutions) for 
effective eco-management.
Before the EU accession, country’s laws, standards and institutions were harmonized 
with the Community Acquis. That introduced a modern framework for eco-governance 
including new rights (restrictions) on protection of environment, integrated territory, water 
and biodiversity management, preservation of traditional varieties and breeds, animal welfare, 
polluter pay principle s well as corresponding control, monitoring, and assessment institutions 
(e.g. Executive Environmental Agency, Hydro-melioration Agency  etc.).
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The EU accession introduces and enforces a “new order” - strict regulations and control; 
tough quality and environmental standards; financial support for eco-conservation and market 
instability etc. Huge European markets are opened which enhances competition and lets local 
farms explore their comparative advantages (low costs, high quality, specificity and purity of 
produce) and give strong incentives for investments in farm modernization and conforming to 
high product, technology and eco-standards. 
The external demand, monitoring, pressure, and sanctions by the EU lead to better 
enforcement of laws and standards. Internal collective actions and social demand for good 
governance have also got momentum leading to improvement of public management – e.g. 
success of eco-organizations putting a 5-year ban on GM crops, timely reaction against eco-
violation in protected zones, revoking unlawful “exchanges” of valuable public lands etc.
Nevertheless, new “rules of the game” have not been clearly understood by public
authorities, private organizations and individuals. There is not yet readiness for effective 
implementation of new public order because of the lack of information and experience or 
administrative capacity (lack of comprehension, deficient court system, corruption). Often, 
enforcement of eco-standards is difficult since costs for detection and penalizing of offenders 
are high, or there is no direct links between the performance and eco-impact – e.g. banned 
fields burning after harvesting is still widespread in the country [EEA, 2010]. 
The institutional modernization has been also associated with new conflicts between 
diverse private, collective and social interests. However, the results of the public choices have 
not always been for the advantage of effective eco-management. For instance, strong lobbying 
efforts of certain private groups and businesses led to a 20% reduction in numbers and 50% 
reduction in the area of initially identified sites for pan-European network NATURA 2000 
[MWE].
Private modes and strategies of eco-management
Newly evolving market and private structures were inefficient in dealing with various 
economic and eco-issues. Privatization of farmland and assets of ancient public farms took 10 
years to complete while some state assets (e.g. irrigation, services etc.) were not effectively 
reorganised until recently. During much of the period, the management of farmland, land 
related assets (permanent crops; buildings; irrigation, drainage and flood protection facilities), 
eco-systems and water-resources, was in ineffective “temporary” structures (organisation 
under privatisation, liquidation or reorganisation; Privatization Boards, Liquidation Councils, 
Land Commissions etc.). Sales and long-term lease markets for land and other natural 
resources did not emerge until 2000, and annual leasing was the major form for management 
until recently. That was combined with high economic and institutional uncertainty and a big 
inter-dependency of agrarian assets [Bachev, 2010a].
Much of the farming activities were carried in inefficient and unsustainable structures –
public farms, part-time and subsistence farms, production cooperatives, and huge business 
farms based on provisional lease-in contracts (Table 3). Most livestock holdings are also 
miniature “unprofessional” breading the majority of animals in the country (Table 4).
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Table 3. Number, size and importance of different farms in Bulgaria 
  Public Unregistered Cooperatives    Agro-firms    Total
Number of farms
           1989 2101 1600000 na na 1602101
           1995 1002 1772000 2623 2200 1777000
           2000 232 755300 3125 2275 760700
           2010 350900 900 6100 357900
Share in number (%)
           1989 0.13 99.9 100
           1995 99.7 0.1 0.1 100
           2000 99.3 0.4 0.3 100
           2010 98.0 0.25 1.7 100
Share in farmland (%)
           1989 89.9 10.1 100
           1995 7.2 43.1 37.8 11.9 100
           2000 1.7 19.4 60.6 18.4 100
           2010 33.5 23.9 42.5 100
Average size (ha)
           1989 2423.1 0.4 3.6
           1995 338.3 1.3 800 300 2.8
           2000 357.7 0.9 709.9 296.7 4.7
           2010 2.9 807 211.6 8.5
Source: National Statistical Institute 
Table 4. Number and size of livestock holdings 
Type of Share Share Share Average
holdings farms   heads farms    heads   farms       heads heads
Dairy cows 1-2 3-9 20 and  >
      2003 87.3 56.3 11 23.3 0.6 13.5 1.9
      2009 79.6 30.1 14.6 20.0 2.3 36,3 3.3
Buffalo cows 
      2003 85.3 47.5 11.4 20.6 1.2 23 2.3
      2009 63.5 11.4 21.6 11.5 6.9 60,7 7.3
Ewes 1-9 10-49 100 and  >
      2003 56.7 89.3 26 9.6 9.5 0,4 5.9
      2009 29.8 82.8 22.6 13.2 33.2 1,7 10
She-goats
      2003 98.2 86.8 1.2 5.8 0.1 3 2.6
      2009 96.2 67.3 3.3 20.2 0.01 5 3.1
Breeding pigs 1-2 3-9 200 and >
      2003 87.1     34.5 10.2    14.0 0.2 35.1    3.0
      2009 78.8     12.8 14.9     8.8 0.5 57.4     7.8
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food
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Farms adjustments and intensifying competition have been associated with a significant 
decrease in number of unregistered, cooperative and livestock holdings without adequate 
transfer of land, livestock, and environmental management to other structures. Despite some 
augmentation of average farm size, the share of abandoned agricultural lands and primitive 
domestic livestock operations has been considerable from the beginning of transition now.
Dominating modes for carrying out farming activities have had little incentives for 
current and long-term investment to enhance productivity and environmental performance 
[Bachev, 2008]. 
The cooperative’s big membership makes individual and collective control on 
management very difficult and costly. That focuses managerial efforts on short-term 
indicators, gives a great possibility for mismanagement and using cooperatives in the best 
private (managers and associates) interests. Besides, there are differences in the investment 
preferences of diverse coops members due to the non-tradable nature of the cooperative shares 
(“horizon problem”). Given the fact that most members are small shareholders, older in age, 
and non-permanent employees, the incentives for long-term investment for land improvement, 
environmental conservation, and renovation of material and biological assets have been low. 
“Member-oriented” (non-for-profit) nature of the cooperatives also prevents them to adapt to 
diversified needs of members, and market demand and competition.
On the other hand, small-scale and subsistent farms20 possess insignificant internal 
capacity for investment, and small potential to explore economy of scale and scope (big 
fragmentation and inadequate scale). Besides, they have little incentives for non-productive 
environment and biodiversity conservation, animal welfare etc. spending. Moreover, there 
has been neither administrative capacity nor a political will to enforce the quality and eco-
standards in that vast informal sector of the economy. Primitive technologies and low 
compliance with modern agronomic, safety and eco-standards are widespread. Dairy sector 
is particularly vulnerable since only one-third of holdings meet formal EU standards [MAF].
Larger business farms operate mainly on leased land and concentrate on high pay-off 
investment with a short pay-back period (e.g. cereals, sunflower). They are more sensitive to 
market demand and institutional regulations since largely benefit or lose from timely 
adaptation to new standards and market preferences. Besides, these enterprises have higher 
capacity to fund and adapt to new formal and market requirements. However, until recently, 
there has been no effective outside (authority, community) pressure for respecting eco-rules 
by the business enterprises.
Restructuring of commercial farms continues as most of them apply survival tactics 
(“concentration on products with secure marketing”) rather than a long-term strategy toward 
sustainability (preserving soil fertility, observing crop rotation and agro-techniques 
requirements) (Figure 9). What is more, a great portion of subsistent, smaller commercial 
farms and cooperatives are unable to adapt to evolving market, institutional and natural 
environment – intensified market competition; new EU quality, safety, and eco-standards; 
                                                            
20 Subsistence and semi-market farms comprise the best part of farms as almost 1 million are involved 
in farming mostly on a part-time base and for “supplementary” income [MAF].
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challenges associated with climate change etc. Our survey has found out that more than a 
quarter of farms are with a low potential for adaptation to new state and EU quality, safety, 
and environmental standards, almost 37% of them are less adaptable to market demand, 
prices and competition, and every other one is inadaptable to evolving natural environment 
(warning, extreme weather, droughts, floods, etc.).
Figure 9: Share of farms implementing different strategies in Bulgaria (percent)
Source: interviews with farm managers, 2010
Medium-term sustainability of farms is estimated as low for unregistered holdings, 
grazing livestock, and pigs and poultry farms (Figure 10). Less that 7% of all farms “forecast” 
a high sustainability. A particular type of firms (companies) is the only exception where 
majority of enterprises envisages being highly sustainable in years to come. The later reflects 
both the environmental sustainability and the ability of holdings to manage eco-projects.
Smaller size, owner operating and extensive nature of majority of farms let avoid 
certain problems of large public enterprises from the past such as over-intensification, lost 
natural landscape, biodiversity, nitrate and pesticide contamination, huge livestock and 
manure concentration, and uncontrolled erosion. Subsistent and small-scale farming has also 
revived some traditional and more sustainable technologies, varieties, and products, and 
avert Mad cow disease and Avian flu epidemic.
Private mode has introduced incentives and possibilities for integral eco-management 
(including revival of eco- and cultural heritage; anti-pollution, esthetic, an comfort measures), 
investing in eco-system services, origins, labels, and profiting from inter-dependent activities 
such as farming, fishing, agro-tourism, processing, and marketing. There are good examples 
for private introduction and enforcement of quality and eco-standards by individual farms 
(voluntary and trade initiatives), a vertical integrator (dairy and vine processor, retailer, 
exporter), or a foreign investor (cereals, oil crops).
0 20 40 60 80
Produce products with secure marketing
Follow agro-techniques
Use specialized experts assistance 
Put fertilizers and keep rotation
Interested only in current yield
Try to keep soil fertility  
Cooperatives
Private farms
32
Figure 10: Share of farms with different levels of medium-term sustainability in 
Bulgaria
Source: interviews with farm managers, 2010 
Private management is associated with improved environmental stewardship on owned 
and marketed resources, but less concern to manure and garbage management, over-
exploitation of leased and common resources, and contamination of soils, waters and air. The 
process of farms adaptation leads to intensification of production which could revive or 
deepen some eco-problems unless a pro-environmental management is put in place. 
Moreover, free market management of giant and semi-monopoly servicing (water, insurance 
etc.) companies usually comes with unfavourable pricing and terms for majority of farms.
In 1990s the State monopoly “Irrigation Systems” was reorganized into a Joint-stock 
company owned by the Ministry of Agriculture and responsible for the management of state 
assets, provision of irrigation and drinking water, drainage and flood protection. Furthermore, 
the Union of Water Users was initiated and 176 Water User Associations (WUA) emerged. 
This collective form was unable to improve efficiency (low incentives, lack of ownership) 
and deal with monopoly position of 21 semi-autonomous regional branches of Irrigation 
Systems.  
Since 2001 the user-rights on irrigation assets of Irrigation Systems have been freely 
transferred to newly-reestablished WUA. Around 70 WUA are formed servicing 30% of the 
total equipped for irrigation area. However, expected “boom” in efficiency from collective 
management of irrigation has not materialized because of the semi-monopoly situation 
(terms, pricing) of regional water suppliers, few incentives for water users to innovate 
facilities and expand irrigation, and uncompleted privatization of state assets (Bachev, 2011). 
Evolution of various farmers and eco-associations in the country has been hampered by 
the big number and diversified interests of agents – a different ownership size, operation, 
type of farming, preferences, age, and horizon. However, there are few examples for 
effective agrarian organizations mostly with small-membership and strong common interests 
of participants (e.g. tobacco, silk-warm, bee-honey etc.). Furthermore, in recent years some 
environmental organisations have been quite successful in eco-monitoring, campaigns 
against GM crops cultivation and removal of restrictions in protected areas, and other actions 
such as garbage cleaning.  For instance, among other activities Bulgarian Association of Bird 
Protection monitors the birds species varieties and numbers in different type of territories.
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Market modes
Market-driven organic farming has emerged recently and registered a significant 
growth. There has been 11 folds increase in the number of organic operators  since 2003, and 
the organic producers comprise the largest part (74%) of the organic operators totaling 432 
farms, processors, and traders [EUROSTAT]. 
There is enormous augmentation of organic areas and livestock but they are a tiny 
portion of the Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) and livestock (Table 5). “Fully converted 
organic areas” accounts for 25.4% of total organic areas with Industrial crops, Pastures and 
meadows, and Permanent crops comprising the biggest shares of fully converted areas 
[EUROSTAT]. There are few livestock farms and apiaries certified for bio-production with 
highest growth in organic goats and sheep, and a lion share of bees. There are also 242677 ha 
approved for gathering of wild organic fruits and herbs [MAF].
Table 5. Evolution of organic production in Bulgaria  
Organic indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Farming area, ha 650 1113 2432 3061 11808 16663
% in UAA 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.33
Wild herbs, fruits, ha - - - 110143 397835 397835
Cattle na na 395 na 395 470
% in all cattle 0.11 0.11 0.14
Sheep na na 294 na 1690 2471
% in all sheep 0.02 0.14 0.21
Goats na na 32 na 1058 na
% in all goats 0.01 0.12
Bees colonies na na 23508 na 35747 na
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food, EUROSTAT 
Organic form has been introduced by business entrepreneurs who managed to organize 
and fund this new venture arranging independent certification and finding buyers for highly 
specific output. Produced bio-fruits, vegetables, oil plants, herbs, spices, and honey are 
mostly for export since a tiny market for organic products exists in the country. The slow 
development of organic market is caused by the high prices of products, and limited 
consumer confidence in the authentic character of products and certification. 
Eco-labeling of processed farm products (self-regulation) has also appeared but it is 
perceived more as a part of the marketing strategy of companies rather than a genuine eco-
action. What is more, (free) market management of semi-monopoly servicing companies 
comes with unfavorable pricing and terms for farmers, and only few among them purchase 
water or insurance against natural disasters (draughts, floods etc).
Public modes
During the transitional period public (Government and local authority) intervention in 
environmental management was not significant, comprehensive, sustainable, or even related 
[Bachev, 2008]. Eco-policies were fragmented and reactive to urgent problems (natural 
disasters) with different agencies responsible for individual aspects of eco-management. 
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In passed years a number of national programs have been developed to deal with 
specific eco-challenges such as: preservation of biodiversity and environment; limitation of 
emissions of Sulphur Dioxide, VOC, Ammonia; waste management; development of water 
sector; combating climate change; developing organic agriculture; management of lands and 
fights against desertification; agrarian and rural development etc. National monitoring 
systems of environment and biodiversity are also set up, and mandatory eco-assessment of 
public programs introduced. Nevertheless, actual eco-policies rest fragmented and largely 
reactive to urgent eco-problems (floods, storms, drought) rather that based on a long-term 
strategy for sustainable development. As a result of inefficient priority setting, management 
and enforcement (bad coordination, gaps, incompetence, ineffective enforcement, 
corruption), and administrative capability21 a minor impact of public programs prevails.
National expenditures for protection and restoration of environment are merely 1.9% of 
GDP, and agriculture is getting a tiny portion of the total public eco-spending [MEW]. What 
is more, recent financial and economic crisis further deteriorated funding of public 
(including environmental) projects. For instance, recultivation of degradated farmlands by 
MAF was initiated recently but it accounts only for 200-250 ha per year [EEA, 2010]. 
Similarly, serious eco-challenge is still caused by the state deficiency in storing and disposal 
of out-of-dated pesticides which are responsible for a good part of all polluted localities in 
the country [EEA, 2010]. 
There has been a numerous international (UN, EU, NGOs etc.) assistance projects to 
“fill the gap” in local failures but they have been limited in scale, unsustainable in time; 
often overtaken by local groups, funding improperly used; and with no significant positive 
impact. 
Agrarian education and the National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS) has not 
been effectively reorganized and provide modern and continues training on rural 
development and eco-, climate change, and water-management issues. They do not reach all 
agents via effective methods of education, advice and information suited to the specific 
needs of different agents. 
Furthermore, the integral approach of soil, water and biodiversity management in 
planning, funding, management, monitoring, controlling and assessment is not applied, and 
stakeholders involved in decision-making process at all levels. Neither modern eco-system 
services, life-cycle, water accounts, and other modern approaches have been incorporated 
into program management. 
Environmental data collection and monitoring have significantly improved in the last 
few years caching up with the modern EU standards. However, adequate information and 
independent assessment has not been secured yet and include: agricultural benefits and 
impacts; waters quality; total costs; eco- and water-foot prints; impacts of climate change; 
existing and likely risks etc. Nor mechanisms for timely disclosure and effective 
communication of data to decision-makers, stakeholders and public at large are assured. 
                                                            
21 e.g. due to organizational and financial reasons Ministry of Water and Environment often does not 
get the relevant water information from the institutes of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences [EEA, 2010].
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Agrarian and environment related research has not been modernized and severely 
underfunded in last twenty years. Consequently, agro-environmental innovation as well as 
the understanding of the agricultural use and impacts on natural environment, and various 
aspects, factors and efficiency of eco-management greatly deterred. 
Furthermore, during most of the transition agrarian long-term credit market was 
practically blocked while newly evolving farming structures left unassisted by the 
government. Until 2000 the Aggregate Level of Support to Agriculture was close to zero, 
and very small afterward [Bachev, 2010a]. Besides, the multifunctional role of farming was 
not recognized, and the provision of “environmental service” funded by society.
There has been enormous progress in public support in recent years – e.g. National 
Fund Agriculture, EU Special Pre-accession Program for Agrarian and Rural Development 
(SAPARD), EU CAP measures etc.  SAPARD introduced measure “Agro-ecology” but it 
was not approved by the end 2006 and few projects were actually supported. In 2008 EC 
suspended SAPARD due to mismanagement and a significant funding lost.
EU accession brought new opportunities for public support to private and collective 
agrarian and eco-activities. CAP and the National Plan for Agrarian and Rural Development 
2007-2013 (NPARD) provide significant funding for EU area-based payments and national 
top-ups; agro-environmental measures (organic farming, management of agricultural lands 
with high natural value and handicaps, traditional livestock, protection of soils and water, 
preservation of landshaft); modernization of farms, processing, and marketing; 
diversification of activity; infrastructural development; keeping traditions; training etc. 
Specialized budget of NPARD directed for various eco-measures accounts for 27% of the 
total. Funding for eco- and other projects is also available from EU Fund LIFE+ and the 
Operational Programs “Environment”, “Fishery and Aquaculture”, and “Regional 
Development”.
The “cross-compliance” (with safety, animal-welfare, environmental etc. standards) for 
receiving a public support has been also introduced. Consequently, area-based direct 
payments and other subsidies improved farms income and eco-performance, induced farming 
on abandoned lands, and brought about some amelioration of environmental situation. 
However, it becomes difficult to reform the inefficient system of management of public 
programs. In 2007 no public payment was made for projects associated with NPARD 
measures but area-based payments for regions with handicaps. Progression in the 
implementation of public support has been slow and far behind the targets (Table 6). While 
measures “Setting up of young farmers” and “Payments to farmers in regions with handicaps” 
are successful, the number of approved and funded projects in other areas is insignificant.
Due to the restrictive criteria22, lack of formal land management titles, complicated and 
costly procedures, and widespread mismanagement, the new public support is not effectively 
utilized and benefits unevenly different farms. Mostly bigger farms participate in public 
                                                            
22 For area-based payments the minimum farm size is 1 ha (for permanent crops 0.5 ha), and for agro-
ecological payments 0.5 ha, while landless livestock holdings are not-eligible for these type of support.
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programs because of the superior entrepreneurial experience, available resources, and 
capability for adaptation to formal requirements and for wining projects. 
Table 6. Progress in implementation of 2007-2013 NPARD in Bulgaria (% of target) 
Measures Dec. 31, 2008 Dec. 31, 2009 Dec. 31, 2010
Project
s
Euro Project
s
Euro Projects Euro
111 Training and information 0 - 0 - na -
112 Setting up young farmers 11.25 - 55.20 - 99.73 -
121 Modernization of farms 6.77 6.27 27.86 16.09 35.62 25.49
122 Economic value of forests 0 0 0 0 0 0
123 Value to agricultural and 
forestry products
0 0 0 0 5.81 4.41
141 Semi-subsistence farm 0 - 0 - 3.37 -
142 Producer groups 0 0 0 0 0 0
143 Advice and consultation 3.62 - 9.30 - 24.38 -
211 Payments to mountainous 
areas with handicaps 
40.04 - 43.50 - 43.50 -
212 Payments to other areas 
with handicaps 
100.17 - 107.85 - 107.85 -
214 Environment payments 2.80 - 4.45 - 4.45 -
223 First afforestation 0 - 1.00 1.85 -
226 Restoring forestry 0 - 0.90 - 2.30 -
311 Diversification into non-
agricultural activities
0 - 0 - 0.09 0
312 Business development 0 - 0 - 2.09 -
313 Agro and rural tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0
321 Rural services 0 - 4.77 - 8.15 46.19
322 Village development 0 - 18.00 - 19.50 43.07
431-32 Local cooperation 0 - 0 - 7.92 -
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Up to date experience shows that the bulk of public subsidies go to few large agri-firms 
and cooperatives specialized in field crops. At the same time, many effective small-scale 
farms receive no or only a tiny fraction of the public support. For instance, despite it 
increased number only 24% of all farms currently receive area based payments, and merely 6% 
of cattle holdings, 4% of sheep and pig holdings, and 3% of poultry farms [MAF]. Moreover, 
less than 7% of beneficiaries get the lion share (more than 80%) of all direct payments. 
Similarly, around 2% of the biggest farms (more than 500 ha) manage around 60% of 
supported by the environmental measures 211 and 212 areas [MAF].  
The overall support to agriculture continues to rest low, and a small proportion of 
farms benefits from public aid most of them being large enterprises from regions with less 
socio-economic and eco-problems. Experts assessment indicates that there is a good or 
significant impact of CAP implementation on economic, social and environmental 
sustainability of large farms, agri-firms, and farms specialized in field crops, while the CAP 
effect on other type of farms is insignificant or neutral (Figure 11). Therefore, public 
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assistance further enlarges “transitional” disparities between different farms, sub-sectors, 
eco-systems, and regions. The minor amount of supported farms and agro-ecosystems, 
deficiency of clear criteria for eco-performance, and the lack of effective control leads to 
little contribution of new public (CAP) measures to improvement of eco-situation in the 
country.
Figure 11: Impact of CAP on economic, social and environmental sustainability of 
Bulgarian farms 
Source: expertise with leading experts, 2012
4. Efficiency of environmental management in agriculture
Land management
A by-product from the new market and private management has been considerable 
disintensification of agriculture, ease of general eco-pressure and pollution comparing to the 
pre-reform level.
Market adjustment has been associated with a sharp decline in all crop (but sunflower) 
and livestock (but goat) productions since 1989 23 . Some traditional crop varieties and 
livestock breeds have been also recovered. A considerable portion of agricultural lands has 
been left uncultivated for a long period - in some years abandoned land reached one third of 
the total [MAF]. In recent years, unutilized farmlands are 10% of the total while fallow land 
accounts for 9% of the arable land. The average yields for major products shrunk to 40-80% 
of the pre-reform level. 
The number of livestock has also decreased significantly – 51% for cattle, 53% for 
poultry, 80 % for pigs, and 81% for sheep [MAF]. Consequently, the Aggregate Livestock 
Index24 in the country has been one of the smallest in Europe - 0.4 in recent years [EEA, 
2010].
                                                            
23 For potatoes by 33%, wheat 50%, corn and burley 60%, tomatoes, Alfalfa hay and table grape 75%, 
apples 94%, pig meat 82%, cattle meat 77%, sheep and goat meat 72%, poultry meat 51%, cow milk 
45%, sheep milk 66%, buffalo milk 59%, wool 85%, eggs 45%, and honey 57% [NSI].
24 the number of livestock units (equines, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry and rabbits) per UAA.
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Tractors and combines employed in agriculture have diminished by 64%, and now 5.6% 
of farms own tractors and 0.7% harvesters while 30-40% hire or use them in association 
[MAF]. All these have relaxed the overall agricultural pressure on the environment.
The amount of fertilizers and pesticides used in agriculture has declined considerably, 
and now their per ha application is 22% and 31% of the 1989 level (Figure 12). In recent 
years N, P and K fertilizers are applied for 37.4%, 3.4% and 1.9% of UAA [MAF]. A sharp 
reduction in chemical use has diminished drastically the risk of chemical contamination of 
soils, waters, and farm produce. A good part of farm production has got (semi) “organic” 
character obtaining a good reputation for high quality and safety locally and internationally.
Figure 12: Irrigation and chemical application in Bulgarian agriculture  
Source: National Statistical Institute  
However, a negative rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P, K intakes dominate and 
average of 23595,4t N, 61033,3t P205 and 184392t K20 have been irreversibly removed 
annually from soils since 1990 [EEA, 2010]. Unbalance of nutrient components has been 
typical with application of 5.3 times less P and 6.7 times less K with the appropriate N rate. 
What is more, monoculture or simple rotation has been constantly practiced by large 
operators concentrating on few profitable crops (sunflower, cereals etc.). All these practices 
further contributed to deterioration of soil quality and soil organic matter content.
There has been considerable increase in farmland affected by acidification (Figure 13). 
That is a result of the long-term application of specific nitrate fertilizers and unbalanced 
fertilizer application without adequate input of phosphorus and potassium The share of 
acidified soil decreased after 1994, but in recent years there is a reverse tendency along with 
the augmentation of N use. As much as 4.5% of acidified farmlands are with level harmful 
for crops. 
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Figure 13: Share of degradated agricultural lands in Bulgaria (percent)   
Source: Executive Environment Agency  
Fraction of salinized land doubled after 1989 but it is merely 1.1% of the to
[EEA, 2010]. Widespread application of primitive irrigation techniques, and inappropriate 
crop choice, rotation and agro-techniques augment inefficiency of water use and local
erosion. Since 1990 no effective measures are taken to normalize soil acidity and salinity.
Pollution of soil and water from industrial activities, waste management, and improper 
farming activities is also a serious environment and health risk. Illeg
areas have noticeably increased reaching an official figure of 4000 with a real number f
bigger than reported amount 
“production” with organic and industrial materials 
pollution of air, water, soils, and disturbing population comfort (noise, odor, dirty roads etc.). 
Nevertheless, data for the last years show that soils in the country are in good ecological 
state both in terms of organic content and contamination with heavy metals and metalloids. 
Polluted with heavy metals and pesticides soils represe
2010].
Erosion has been a major factor contributin
progressing level is a result of extreme weather but it has been also adversely affected by the 
dominant agro-techniques, deficiency of anti
and recultivation of permanent grasslands. Due to ineffective management 34% of ar
lands are subjected to wind erosion and 64% to water erosion 
erosion affects 25-65% of farmland and losses varied from 0.2 to 40 t/ha in different years. 
Annual losses of earth masses from water erosion are estimated at 145Mt 
comes from the arable land. Soil losses from water erosion depend on cultivation practices 
and range from 8 t/y for permanent crops to 48 t/y for arable lands. Losses from wind 
erosion are around 30 t/y and depend on deforestation, unco
rotation, plowing pastures etc.
Soil compression affects (mostly) agricultural lands due to untimely transportation and 
inappropriate agro-techniques (e.g. using heavy machineries when soil moisture is high). It is 
considered as a threat for soils but no data are available for the extent in agricultural lands.
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Water management
Restructuring of farms and production has been accompanied with a sharp reduction in 
irrigated farmland and a considerable distortion of irrigation facilities (Figure 12). There has 
been more than 21 folds decline in water used in agriculture comparing to 1989 (Table 7). In 
recent years, sector “Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery” comprises merely 3.2% of 
the total water use, and 0.3% of generated waste waters [NSI]. All these contribute to a 
considerable reduction of water stress in the country - since 1990 the Water Exploitation 
Index declined considerably from 55% (the second in Europe) to 33% [EEA, 2010].
Table 7. Evolution and agricultural use of water resources in Bulgaria 
Indicators 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007
Total water resources (109/m3/year) 21 21 21 21
Water resources per capita 
(m3/inhabitant/year)
2427 2562 2661 2748
Total water withdrawal (109/m3/year) 14,04 na 8,674 na
Agricultural water withdrawal 
(109/m3/year)
3,058 0,141 0,144 0,143
Share of agricultural water withdrawal in 
total (%)
21.78 - 1.66 -
Share of total actual renewable water 
resources withdrawn by agriculture (%)
14.36 0.66 0.68 0.67
Area equipped for irrigation (1000 ha) 1263 789 622 104,6
Share of cultivated area equipped for 
irrigation (%)
29.17 17.55 17.36 3.18
Area equipped for irrigation actually 
irrigated (%)
na 5.42 4.96 51.29
Source: FAO, AQUASTAT 
There is a huge reduction of irrigated farmland after 1990 as 2-5% of the irrigation 
network has been actually used 25 . What is more, a considerable physical distortion of 
irrigation facilities has taken place affecting most part of the internal canals. As a result the 
area equipped for irrigation in agriculture substantially decreased. Furthermore, primitive 
irrigation techniques have been widespread and augmented inefficiency of water use and 
local soil erosion. Water losses in the irrigation system amount 70% as consequence of the 
poorly maintained facilities, low efficiency, and water stealing [Alexandrov]. Nevertheless, 
the overall negative irrigation impact of irrigation on erosion and salinization has been 
diminished considerably after 1990 [EEA, 2010].
The decline in irrigation has also had a direct harmful effect on crop yields and 
structure of rotation [Bachev, 2010b]. The level of irrigation depends on the humidity in 
each year, kind of irrigated crops and water prices. Irrigation has not been effectively used to 
correct inappropriate seasonal and regional distribution of rainfalls, and mitigate effect of 
                                                            
25 Irrigation water accounts for the major share in total agricultural water use – 74.2% [NSI].
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climate change26 on farming and land degradation. Farms little capability for adaptation has 
resulted in huge crop, livestock and property losses during recent droughts and floods.
There has been a considerable amelioration of the quality of surface and ground waters 
as a result of unintended decrease of negative impact of agriculture and the sharp decline in 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides application. This trend has diminished drastically the 
pressure on environment and the risk of chemical contamination of soils and waters.
Nitrate and phosphate content in surface water decreased throughout transition and 
slightly increase in the last 3 years [EEA, 2010]. Currently only 0.7% of samples exceeds the 
Ecological Limit Value (ELV) for nitrate. Despite improvement, many water eco-systems 
are at risk cased by the agricultural emissions in water and increasing application of 
chemicals. In drinking water around 5% of analyses show deviation of nitrates up to 5 times 
above the appropriate level [EEA, 2010]. The later is mostly restricted to 400 small 
residential locations but it is also typical for almost 9% of the big water collection zones. 
Improper use of nitrate fertilizers, inappropriate crop and livestock practices, and non-
compliance with the specific rules for farming in water supply zones, are all responsible for 
that problem.
Around a quarter of riverlength does not meet the standards for water quality [MAF]. 
Monitoring of water for irrigation shows that in 45% of samples, the nitrates concentration 
exceeds contamination limit 2-20 folds [EEA, 2010]. Nitrates are also the most common 
polluter of ground waters with slight excess over the ecological limit [EEA, 2010]. A 
moderate concentration of N (bellow 25 mg per liter) in different levels of underground 
waters dominates with increasing trends in shallow waters and downward trends in others. 
Besides, around country a tendency for reduction in pesticides concentration in underground 
water is reported with occasional cases of Triasines over the ELV after 2000. There is further 
improvement since 2007 and the concentration of pesticides in all samples has been bellow 
the water quality standards. 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones cover 53% of country’s territory and 68% of UAA [MAF].
The lack of effective manure storage capacity and sewer systems in majority of farms, 
challenge posed by inadequate storage and disposal of expired and prohibited pesticides, and 
illegal garbage dumps in rural areas, all contributes significantly to the persistence of the 
problem. Most part of the post-communist livestock activity is carried out by a great number 
of small and primitive holdings often located within residential borders. Moreover, only 0.1% 
of the livestock farms possess safe manure-pile sites, around 81% of them use primitive 
dunghills, and 116 thousands holdings have no facilities at all [MAF]. Besides, decreasing 
amount of manure has been used for fertilization of merely 0.2% of utilized farmlands in 
recent years.
                                                            
26 Eighteen of the past 21 years are with positive anomalies in average temperatures and there is a 
trend for increasing soils’ water deficiency [EEA, 2010]. According to climate forecasts temperature 
will continue to increase, rains quantity to decrease, more extreme events (thunderstorms, floods, 
droughts, hurricane winds) to occur, and water stress experienced around the country. 
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Serious eco-challenge has been posed by inadequate storage and disposal of expired 
and prohibited pesticides which amount has augmented since 2001[EEA, 2010]. A good 
portion of country’s polluted localities (28%) is associated with these dangerous chemicals. 
Despite progression in management (modernization of storehouses, safe capsulation, 
exporting for deactivation) in the past years there are still 298 abandoned storehouses (57% 
of all) in 292 locations containing 1956t old pesticides (15.3% of the total amount). 
In the last several years a stable amount of nullified sediments from industrial and 
residential waters have been utilized in agriculture and for recultivation of degradated lands. 
In 2010 the applied sediments in agriculture and for recultivation of degradated lands 
(13644t dry content) increased up to 49% share of the totally utilized sediments in the 
country [EEA, 2010].
Biodiversity management
Since 1990 the amount of protected areas in the country almost doubled [NSI]. 
Specially introduced rules for agricultural practices in NATURA territories and CAP eco-
and other measures additionally created conditions for improvement of biodiversity 
management. 
Furthermore, market and private initiatives led to recovering of some traditional (and 
more sustainable) livestock breeds and plants varieties as well as introducing new crops and 
livestock (novel food, industrial and energy crops; exotic animals like ostrich etc.) increasing 
agricultural biodiversity.
Nevertheless, the widespread lack of proper eco-management has affected negatively 
biodiversity in some agro- and related ecosystems. For instance, the intensive cereal and 
industrial crop enterprises have paid little attention to biodiversity protection in enormous 
fields of operations. On the other hand, considerable portion of farmlands have been left 
uncultivated for a long time or entirely abandoned, and some agro-ecosystems lost their 
“agro” character turning into natural ecosystems. That has caused uncontrolled 
“development” of species allowing development of some of them and suppressing others. 
Some of the most valuable ecosystems (natural grassland) have been also severely 
damaged27. Part of the meadows has been left under-grazed or under mowed, and intrusion 
of shrubs and trees took places. Some fertile semi-natural grasslands have been converted to 
cultivation of crops, vineyards, or orchards. This has resulted in irreversible disappearance of 
plant species diversity. In addition, certain municipal and state pastures (with official and/or 
practical “common access” status) have been degraded by unsustainable use (over-grazing) 
by private and domestic animals. Besides, a reckless collection of valuable wild plants 
(berries, herbs, flowers) and animals (snail, snakes, fish) have led to destruction of all natural 
habitats.
                                                            
27 20% of agricultural lands in Bulgaria are lands of High Nature Value [MAF].
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The Index of Birds in Agricultural Lands in the country is negative and for the last 5 
years the variety of bird species under monitoring living in agricultural lands has decreased 
by 10% [EEA, 2010]. The birds in agricultural territories are with the largest amount of 
diminishing number (including moderate and strong tends) but there are no studies on factors 
for these trends.
During the last decades there has been significant degrading impacts of agriculture on 
biodiversity as all 37 typical animal breeds have been endangered, among them 6 are 
irreversibly extinct, 12 are almost extinct, 16 are endangered, and 3 are potentially 
endangered [MEW].
Air and green-house gas management
Agriculture practices contribute to dust and odor contamination of air in some areas. 
Particularly disturbing are the small-scale and domestic livestock operations often located 
within residential territories (villages, town) and increasing local odor and noise pollution. 
Agriculture is also responsible for considerable emissions of certain harmful substances 
in the air. It releases approximately 75% of Ammonia (NH3) and 11% of Non-methane 
organic compounds (NMVOC) in the country (Figure 14). The biggest sources of NH3 are 
cattle (dairy cows and buffalo cows) and for NMVOC - one-year crops with fertilization 
[EEA, 2011]. Agricultural contribution to Nitrogen oxides (NOx) and Carbon monoxide (CO) 
is insignificant – 2.3% and 0.4% accordingly.
Figure 14: Harmful emissions in air from Bulgarian agriculture (2009)
Source: Executive Environment Agency  
There has been enormous reduction of overall green-house gas (GHG) emissions from 
agriculture28 since 1988 (Figure 15). Moreover, the decline in the sector's contribution has 
been higher than the national. That has come as “unintentional” outcome of the post-
communist restructuring of the sector and the new models of farm management. 
                                                            
28 GHGs from Agriculture” result from production and processing of agricultural products, soil 
fertilization, animal manure processing and preservation. Emissions from combustion processes for 
energy production and from agricultural machines are not reported but they are insignificant amount.
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Figure 15: Trends in green-house gas emissions from Bulgarian agriculture
Source: EEA, 2011
During 2000-2004 there was a period of an increase and since then a stable trend for 
diminishing agricultural GHG emissions. The sector is the second biggest emitter of GHGs 
contributing between 7-10% of the total amount during the last decade. The main factors of 
agricultural GHGs have been agricultural soils (56%), enteric fermentation (22%), and 
manure management (19%) [EEA, 2011].
Agriculture mostly produces N2O and CH4 emissions. In the last decade the majority of 
N2O emissions comes from agricultural soils, manure management, and fields burning. The 
methane emission is 36% of the agricultural GHGs and the biggest portion comes from 
enteric fermentation from domestic livestock and manure management. Reduction of 
livestock number is responsible for considerable decrease in agricultural CH4 emission in 
past years. On the other hand, there is a six-fold increase of CH4 from rice cultivation since 
1999 as a result of the partial recovery of this sub-sector. 
Illegal field burning of residues and crops also emits GHGs-precursors which are not 
significant but they doubled since the period before 1990.
5. Impacts of EU CAP implementation of farms natural resources management 
and strategies
CAP effect on environmental sustainability of farms
According to more than a half of the farm managers 29 the overall impact from 
implementation of different mechanisms and instruments of EU CAP (common market, new 
standards and regulations, direct payments, NPARD measures etc.) on their environmental 
sustainability is good (Figure 16). The favorable effect of CAP on eco-sustainability is felt 
                                                            
29 Survey was carrid in the end of 2012 with the managers of 84 commercial farms. The structure of 
juridical type, size, specialization and location of surveyed farms corresponds to the real structure of 
commercial farms in the country.
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by all holdings in regions with natural handicaps, four out of five farms specialized in 
vegetables and located in mountainous regions, three quarters of farms in mix crop-livestock 
production, more than two-third of holdings with grazing livestock, more than 69% of farms 
in plain-mountainous regions, 60% of unregistered holdings, more than 58% of agricultural 
cooperatives, every other farms with small and middle size, in field crops, mix crops, and pig, 
poultry and rabbits.
Figure 16: Impact of EU CAP on environmental sustainability of Bulgarian farms
Source: interviews with farm managers, 2012
None of surveyed farms indicates a negative impact of CAP of ecological aspects of 
their activity. Nevertheless, for all farms specialized in mix livestock, those located in 
protected zones and territories, and for majority of firms with permanent crops, plan regions 
and big size, the impact from implementation of CAP instruments on environmental 
sustainability of farms is insignificant or neutral.
More than third of farms, receiving agri-environmental payments (Measure 123) report, 
that effect of that support on their farm in good (Figure 17). Also a good portion of farms 
with payments for mountainous areas with handicaps (Measure 121) and in areas with 
handicaps different from mountainous (Measure 122) assess as good (accordingly 15,4% 
and 8,3%) and significant (accordingly 7,7% and 8,3%) the effect on these measure on their 
holdings.
Nearly a quarter of the managers of farms supported by „Payments to farmers in 
mountainous areas with handicaps” (Measure 211) assess as good or significant the effect of 
this public instrument on their farm. The impact of this type of payment is strongest for 
holdings with small size, unregistered farms, and farms specialized in permanent crops and 
vegetables. The positive effect of these payments covers two-third of smalls-scale farms, 
every other of unregistered holdings and specialized in permanent crops, and 40% of farms 
specialized in vegetables.
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Figure 17: Share of Bulgarian farms assessing as good or significant the impact on 
NPARD measures on their farms (percent)
Source: interviews with farm managers, 2012
Less than 17% of the managers of surveyed farms supported by “Payments to farmers 
in other areas with handicaps” (Measure 212) evaluate the impact of this instrument as good
or significant. 
The effect of Agri-environmental payments” (Measure 214) is estimated as good by 
two-third of the managers of cooperatives supported by these payments, and a half of 
holdings with small size, agri-corporations, and specialized in vegetables and permanent 
crops,   and 40% of farms specialized in field crops, one third of holdings with big size and 
mix crop-livestock operations, and nearly 29% of unregistered holdings and farms with 
middle size. The impact of this public instrument on all other farms is either insignificant or 
neutral (including for all Sole Traders, and farms specialized in livestock, and holdings in 
protected zones and territories).
Dynamics of farms indicators comparing to period before CAP implementation
The greatest share of surveyed farms indicates an increased level of a part of the main 
indicators in the present time comparing to the levels in the period before EU CAP 
implementation (Figure 18). For instance, higher or considerable higher is the level of the 
total income, costs, investments, profit, labor productivity, efficiency of the production and 
management in the majority of farms. Also the biggest portion of holdings has an improved 
access to public support, and augmented amount of subsidies for production, income and 
investment support. At the same time, the share of farms with lower total indebtedness 
comparing to the pre-accession period is 38%, while with a higher one bellow 18%. 
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Figure 18: Levels of farms indicators comparing to level before CAP implementation in 
Bulgaria
Source: interviews with farm managers
According to the more than a half of farms they have an improved qualification and 
information, agro-techniques and crop rotation, and livestock conditions, as well as increased 
product and food safety, and innovation activity comparing to the period before CAP 
implementation.  All that is a direct or indirect result of the favorable impact on different CAP 
mechanisms on the key aspects of the activities of majority of surveyed farms.
However, a good fraction of farms report lack of change in share of sold output, market 
access, diversification of products and services, deepening of specialization, and in 
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environmental preservation. Also a big part of farms have no changes in their dependency 
from suppliers and buyers, increased integration with suppliers and buyers, and improved 
involvement in professional organizations and access to the agricultural advisory system.
Furthermore, a big portion of holdings do not report changes in the profitability, land 
and livestock productivity, overall indebtedness and financial independency, efficiency of 
production, management and contractual relations, competiveness, economic and social 
sustainability, agro-techniques and crop rotation, livestock conditions, product and food safety, 
introduction of innovation, qualification and information. Besides, more than a third of farms 
have no improvement in the relations with state organizations and in the access to public 
support in comparison to the pre-accession period.
Therefore, implementation of diverse instruments of CAP does not lead to a progressive 
change in the man indicators of a good part of farms. The later is either due to the lack of 
positive effect from CAP on a portion of holdings (for example, lack of effective public 
support) or due to neutralized effect of CAP on other negative factors which could have 
deteriorated even further the state of farms (in conditions of lack of counterbalancing the 
existing negative trends CAP instruments).
For a considerable share of farms the current levels of the main indicators is lower or 
significantly lower comparing to the level before CAP introduction. For instance, 27% of 
surveyed holdings indicate deteriorated financial independence, more than 24% are with 
diminished profit, almost 17% are with reduced net income and competitiveness, around 16% 
are with inferior economic sustainability, almost 15% are with lower profitability, and 14% 
are with deteriorated social sustainability. Similarly, nearly 19% of farms are with worsened 
relations with the state organizations, above 13% of them have decreased efficiency of 
contractual relations, every tenth is with inferior livestock conditions, almost 9% of holdings 
are with decreased access to public support, and more than 8% are with reduced membership 
in professional organizations.
All these show that CAP implementation is associated with deterioration of main 
indicators of a considerable portion of farms. This is either because of the negative effects of 
CAP on a party of farms, or due to the lack of effective mechanisms for assisting the farms 
adaptation and for compensating the influence of other negative factors (e.g. competition with 
heavily subsidized imported products at the national and international markets, high interest 
rates of bank credits, big market price fluctuations etc.). 
Therefore, CAP implementation does not contribute to improvement of natural
resources conservation capability and efficiency in a great portion of farms in the country.
That necessitates improvement of the CAP implementation through perfection of management 
public programs, change in design and/or beneficiaries of some CAP instruments, or requires
rethinking and reforming individual mechanisms or the policy as a whole.
6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
Our analysis has demonstrated that suggested new framework let better understand, 
assess and improve natural resources conservation management and strategies in the specific 
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market, institutional and natural environment of individual farms, ecosystems, regions, sub-
sectors and countries.
We have showed that post-communist transition and EU integration has brought about 
significant changes in environmental management in Bulgarian agriculture. Newly evolved 
market, private and public governance has led to a significant improvement of eco-
management and eco-impacts of agriculture introducing modern eco-standards and public 
support, enhancing environmental stewardship, disintensifying production, recovering 
landscape and traditional productions, and diversifying quality, eco-products and services. 
Agrarian transition and integration has been also associated with some new challenges 
such as unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, lost biodiversity, land degradation, 
water and air contamination etc.
Furthermore, implementation of the “common” EU policies has been having unlike 
results in the specific “Bulgarian” conditions. Up to date (and likely in a short and medium 
term) it enlarges income, technological, and eco-discrepancy between different farms, sub-
sectors, and regions. In a longer-term eco-hazard(s) caused by agriculture will likely expand 
unless effective public and private measures are taken to mitigate existing eco-problems and 
risks. Moreover, the specific structures for management of farming activity (small 
commercial, semi-market, and subsistence farms, production cooperatives, large business 
firms) will continue to dominate in years to come and have to incorporate the eco-
management needs.
Therefore, a significant improvement of public (Government, EU) interventions in 
agrarian and eco-management is needed to enhance sustainability of prospective farms and 
sustainable agrarian and rural development. Implementation of the EU common (agricultural, 
environmental, regional etc.) policies would have no desired impacts on environmental 
conservation and improvement unless special measures are taken to improve eco-information 
and assessments; modernize the system of property rights, public regulations and 
enforcement; perfect management of public organizations, programs and services; and 
extend public support to and partnerships with dominating farming (including small-scale 
and subsistence) structures etc.
Our analysis has identified that the major problems, challenges and risks in eco-
management of Bulgarian agriculture at the current state of development are:
- inadequate and/or badly coordinated and funded management strategies for natural 
resources conservation;
- lack of appropriate information and assessments on eco-pressures, states, impacts and 
risks available for all farmers and other agents related with natural environment;
- ineffective system of formal property rights (rules) and public enforcement of laws, 
contracts and official standards;
- farmland degradation (exhaustion, erosion, contamination, compression);
- ineffective water utilization and waters contamination;
- air pollution;
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- adverse effect on natural biodiversity;
- poor waste management (burning fields, illegal garbage dumping and yards, 
ineffective storing and disposal of old chemicals);
- not-motivated, incapable and/or unsustainable farming structures;
- lack of effective eco-organizations able to mitigate existing and emerging eco-
conflicts and risks; 
- lack of sufficient eco-education in farmers and other stakeholders;
- lack of effective system of eco-innovations;
- ineffective forms of public involvement – inadequate, under or over-intervention; 
gaps in planning, coordination and regulations; high controversy, unpredictability and costs; 
insufficient capability and funding; large-scale mismanagement; lack of participation of and 
partnership with other stakeholders etc.
Therefore, further improvement of institutional environment, public policies and modes 
of public intervention is necessary to modernize the system of eco-management in 
agriculture. More particularly public policies and strategies are to be directed to:
First, better integration of environmental (including neglected eco-system services, 
ground water etc.) policy in agrarian and development policies as effective design and 
enforcement of long-term eco-measures get a high priority. Up to date most public efforts 
have been put on addressing urgent socio-economic (e.g. financial) problems while 
improvement of eco-management is perceived as unimportant. Accordingly, no measures are 
taken to mitigate or prevent various eco-risks (e.g. impacts of climate change, constant 
practicing of monoculture, re-intensification etc.). Furthermore, it is to be stability and 
certainty in eco-policy (long-term public commitment rather than frequent changes) in order 
to induce effective private and collective actions. For instance, a major reason for low 
investments in otherwise efficient agricultural green energy (energy crops; manure, biomass 
and wind energy production) has been the big uncertainty about the long-term policy in the 
area.  
Second, complete application of integral approach of soil, water and biodiversity 
management in planning, funding, management, monitoring, controlling and assessment at 
all levels with stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making. Moreover, eco-system services, 
life-cycle, eco-, energy and water accounts and footprints, and other modern approaches are 
to be incorporated into program design and management at all levels.
Third, improving coordination and efficiency of actions of various public and private 
agents involved in eco-management. Individual elements and responsibilities in public eco-
management are usually divided between various agents and organizations with poor 
coordination, conflicting interests, and inconsistency, controversies, gaps and inefficiency of 
actions.
Forth, better defining, regulating and further privatizing (collectivizing) property, user, 
management, trading, discharge etc. rights and assets related to eco-resources, eco-system 
services, renewable energy supply, (N, GHG) emissions, waste discharges etc. 
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Five, employing a greater range of economic instruments including appropriate pricing, 
quotas, public funding and insurance, taxing, interlinking etc. to improve eco-resources use 
efficiency and risk-sharing, prevent over-intensification and pressure on natural resources, 
and support farms adaptation to changing market, institutional and natural environment.
Six, organizationally and financially securing adequate eco-data collection, monitoring, 
and independent assessment, including agricultural linkages with the state of environment: 
soil, water and air contamination; impacts on biodiversity; waste production and 
decomposition; total social costs, energy intensity, eco- (water) foot-print, benefits from 
farming; effect on eco-conservation and improvement; renewable energy production; 
impacts of climate change; existing and likely risks etc. What is more, adequate mechanisms 
to assure timely disclosure and effective communication of available information to 
decision-makers, stakeholders and public at large are to be put in place.
Seven, better adapting EU CAP and national instruments to the specific Bulgarian 
conditions through greater support to farm modernization and adaptation, eco-innovations, 
and prospective business and non-for profit modes; relaxing the EU criteria for semi-market 
and young farmers; directing funds to prospective (Farm modernization and adaptation, 
Young farmers, environmental), and unsupported (Organic livestock, restoration of 
abandoned farmland) measures and organizations (livestock, public academic centers); and 
better implementing planed eco- measures.
Nine, improving eco-education and training of farmers, administrators, other 
stakeholders and public at large through modernization of agrarian education and 
Agricultural Education and Advisory Service. The later are to reach all agents via effective 
methods of education, advice, and information (TV, radio, on line information; 
demonstration) suited to their specific needs; set up a system of continues training and 
sharing experiences; include eco-, water, waste management, climate change and rural 
development issues; cooperate with other (public and private) academic institutions and 
private organizations; involve farmers and stakeholders in programs management, 
implementation and assessment at all levels.
Eight, employing more hybrid (public-private, public-collective) modes given their 
coordination, incentives, and control advantages. Public organization and enforcement of 
most eco-standards is very difficult (especially in huge informal sectors and remote areas). 
Public support to voluntary initiatives of professional, community and non-governmental 
organizations (informing, training, assisting, funding, risk-sharing), and assistance in 
cooperation at grass-root, eco-system, watershed, trans-regional, trans-border levels is much 
more efficient. Accordingly, real participation of farmers and stakeholders in priority setting, 
management, and assessment of public programs and regulations at all levels is to be 
institutionalized.
Ten, improving the overall institutional environment and public governance perfecting 
property rights protection, laws and contracts enforcement, combating against 
mismanagement and corruption in public sector, removing restrictions for market, private 
and collective initiatives etc.
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Eleven, giving more public support to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research 
on all aspects and impacts of eco-management, including factors and forms of eco-
management, and their impact on individual and collective eco-behavior and environmental
preservation. Up to date efforts of Ecologists, Technologists, Economists, Law, Sociologists, 
Behavioral and Political Scientists have been rarely united; most studies focus on individual 
aspect(s) of sustainability, or certain form(s) of management, or management level, or 
geographical location. What is more, the governance of farming is usually separated from the 
management of households and rural activities; and “normative” (to some “ideal” or “model 
in a foreign country”) rather than comparative (between feasible alternatives) approach is 
broadly employed; and significant social (third-party, recovery, transaction etc.) costs largely 
ignored. Consequently, institutional, behavioral, economic, ecological, international etc. 
factors of environmental sustainability are not properly understood, spectrum of feasible 
management modes properly identified, and efficiency, complementarities, and prospects of 
development adequately assessed. 
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